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“Perhaps we might say that the friendship between the Netherlands and 
the United States is a story that is not over, a tale of wonder and 
misunderstanding and friendship and mutual help for two hundred 
years.”  
 
– J.W. Schulte Nordholt, The Dutch Republic  
and American Independence (1982), p. 291 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cover illustration: A silver medallion made by Jean George Holtzhey in honor of the 
States-General receiving John Adams as an American envoy to the Dutch Republic on 19 
April 1782. The front is shown, depicting the United States as “A Free Sister” to the 
Dutch Republic. The Dutch Republic places a Phrygian Cap, which signifies freedom and 
the pursuit of liberty, over the United States. The reverse side of the medallion portrays 
Britain in the form of a unicorn breaking its horn on “the rock of valor”. 
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Introduction 
 
John Adams was convinced that “if there was ever among Nations a natural Alliance, one 
may be formed between the [American and Dutch] Republicks. (…) The Originals of the 
two Republicks are so much alike, that the History of the one seems but a Transcript from 
that of the other.”1 To John Adams, and many Americans of his time, it was clear that the 
Dutch Republic was useful as an example for state-building as well as an ally. The 
history of the heroic Dutch struggle against Spanish tyranny in the sixteenth century 
constituted a useful precedent for the American colonists who resisted British tyranny in 
the eighteenth century. And for at least the first century of its independence the Dutch 
Republic had demonstrated that a loosely confederated republic could hold its own on the 
international stage while enjoying unprecedented economic prosperity. Indeed, a loose 
confederation of North American states, not unlike the Dutch confederation, prevailed in 
the war against Britain.
2
 
The history and institutions of the Dutch republic were well known – or believed 
to be well known – to educated people of the eighteenth century. The chapter on federal 
governance in Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws (1748) praises the federal institutions of 
the Dutch republic. Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776) includes dozens of references to the 
Dutch economic and political experience. Thomas Paine’s Common Sense (1776) 
admires the Dutch political system, arguing that “Holland without a king hath enjoyed 
more peace for this last century than any of the monarchical governments in Europe”.3 In 
the United States parallels with Dutch politics were noted in the discussions that preceded 
adoption of the Articles of Confederation, in letters between revolutionary leaders, and in 
both the federalist and antifederalist papers. The general disposition of eighteenth-century 
Americans was that “we may derive from Holland lessons very beneficial to ourselves”.4 
                                                 
1
 JA, A Memorial To their High Mightinesses, the States General of the United Provinces of the Low 
Countries, 19 Apr. 1781, PJA 11:276-77. 
2
 For a detailed description of the history of the Dutch Republic see J. Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, 
Greatness, and Fall 1477-1806 (London 1995). 
3
 Thomas Paine, The Life and Writings of; edited by D.E. Wheeler (10 vols.; New York 1908) 2:13, 50-51. 
4
 J. Elliot (ed.), The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adaption of the Federal Constitution 
(5 vols.; Washington, D.C., 1854) 3:255.  
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The final decades of the eighteenth century were of critical importance for the still 
fragile United States. Released from British patronage, the American nation now had to 
survive on its own in a hostile world engulfed by intrigue and conflict. The American 
people had embarked on a path to create a new republic which would secure their 
liberties and inalienable rights. During this critical period of state-building the American 
nation looked to, among others, the Netherlands as an example. The Dutch people, after 
all, had shown that a republican state could endure.
 5
 This thesis will focus on the 
question what lessons the United States learned from the Netherlands at the end of the 
eighteenth century, and to what extent the Netherlands could serve as an example for the 
new American nation.  
This thesis will attempt to answer this question by investigating the reports and 
correspondence of American diplomats sent to the Netherlands. In an age when 
communications were slow and news from Europe was unreliable, diplomats were 
considered to be one of the most valuable sources of intelligence on European matters. 
They reported regularly on political, military, and commercial matters that were of 
interest to the American government. Diplomatic reports were a steady and relatively 
reliable supply of information. Though the United States desired to remain independent 
from European politics, in order to succeed in their war effort the United States 
desperately sought recognition of its independence by seeking closer ties with European 
powers. Diplomatic missions were established in, among other places, England, France, 
Spain, and the Netherlands. The diplomatic missions concentrated on two important 
responsibilities: reporting on significant activities in their countries of residence and 
executing formal diplomatic instructions transmitted to them from Congress and later 
also from the Department of State. The European diplomatic missions would keep the 
American government well informed and up to date.
6
  
Because the Dutch Republic was an important center of European diplomacy as 
well as an international credit market the American government established a diplomatic 
                                                 
5
 American revolutionaries used reports from France for potential lessons for their own republic. It then 
seems possible that reports from the Netherlands could also have been used for potential lessons. See J. 
Appleby, ‘Radicalizing the War for Independence: American Responses to the French Revolution’, 
American Studies 41: 1 (1996), 7-16. 
6
 C.A. van Minnen, Yankees onder de zeespiegel: de Amerikaanse diplomaten in de Lage Landen en hun 
berichtgeving, 1815-1850 (Amsterdam 1991), 20-21. 
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mission there. By 1780 the Congress was confident enough to send a representative to 
The Hague in the hopes of obtaining a loan and gaining recognition of American 
independence. The first official envoy to the Dutch Republic was John Adams, who did 
everything in his power to have the States-General recognize the independence of the 
United States and him as its official minister. Another important part of his mission was 
to obtain loans from Dutch bankers to support the American struggle against Britain. 
After the States-General recognized American independence on 19 April 1782, John’s 
mission was complete. But he was only officially recalled in 1788, and succeeded in 1794 
by his son, John Quincy Adams. By the time John Quincy had arrived in The Hague the 
French armies were already marching north to establish a Batavian Republic. John 
Quincy’s primary mission became to observe the consequences of the French 
intervention and how the French Directory treated neutral countries and its allies. In 1797 
he was succeeded by William Vans Murray, a close acquaintance of both Adamses. 
Murray was appointed minister to the Batavian Republic at a time when the United States 
was on the verge of war with France and was engulfed by a political struggle between 
Federalists and Republicans. He too was instructed to keep a close watch on French 
action and intentions. Murray was recalled in 1801, when President Jefferson 
discontinued the office of minister to the Netherlands. 
The letters sent by these three diplomats, this paper assumes, were considered to 
be of significant importance by the American government. The three diplomats, after all, 
were prominent figures in American politics and were recognized as such. In their own 
time they were well respected government officials. John Adams, for instance, was an 
influential member of Congress and his political works on government and constitutions 
were generally well read and received. He was considered knowledgeable enough on 
political matters to draft the Model Treaty and the Massachusetts Constitution, which 
were both used as models for later treaties and constitutions.
7
 John Quincy, too, was a 
respected statesman in his time. One of the people who appreciated him the most was 
President Washington, who appointed him as minister to the Netherlands at a young age. 
Washington considered him to be one of the most valuable public officials abroad and 
                                                 
7
 C. Bradley Thompson, John Adams and the Spirit of Liberty (University Press of Kansas 1998), 23-43; S. 
Elkins and E. McKitrick, The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788-1800 (Oxford 
University Press 1993), 311-13; J. Ferling, John Adams: a life (Knoxville 1992), 1-3. 
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valued his diplomatic reports. Washington’s Farewell Address of 1796 was in part 
inspired by John Quincy’s political writings.8 Finally, during his public career William 
Vans Murray earned the reputation of being an able statesman and devoted Federalist. 
During this time he had become personally and politically acquainted with George 
Washington, who appointed him as minister to the Netherlands, and John Adams, who 
was President during Murray’s diplomatic mission. President Adams had such confidence 
in his diplomatic abilities that he sent Murray to Paris in 1800 to negotiate a peace with 
France to end the Quasi-War. Where others had failed, John believed Murray could 
succeed.
9
 All three diplomats were then established statesmen and received important 
votes of confidence from their peers and political superiors, indicating that their 
diplomatic reports and any words of caution or praise would be taken seriously. 
Moreover, from about 1780 the situation in the Netherlands became increasingly 
important and of great interest to the American government. John Adams was sent to the 
Dutch Republic to have the States-General recognize American independence and 
provide a loan, which would aid the United States in its struggle against Britain. 
International recognition and aid, including the diplomatic mission to the Netherlands, 
were of vital importance to the American government. John Quincy Adams arrived in the 
Netherlands in 1794, a time when the Batavian Republic was being established. Since the 
outbreak of the French Revolution developments in France were followed intensely from 
the other side of the Atlantic. The diplomatic mission to the Netherlands suddenly 
became an ideal means for the United States to observe how France intended to liberate 
the European people and how it treated its allies. William Vans Murray started his 
diplomatic mission when foreign relations with France were deteriorating and tensions 
between the two countries were growing. Murray’s reports kept the American 
government informed about France’s plans and designs, and to what extent France 
controlled the policy of the Batavian Republic – an important American ally. All three 
diplomats were stationed in the Netherlands during critical periods for American state-
                                                 
8
 S.F. Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy (New York 1949), 35-
37, 62-64. 
9
 A. DeConde, ‘William Vans Murray’s Political Sketches: A Defense of the American Experiment’, The 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review 41:4 (Mar. 1955), 627-29; Elkins & McKitrick, Age of Federalism, 
676; Bernard Bailyn calls Murray “a political disciple of John Adams”, The Ideological Origins of the 
American Revolution (New York 1967), 372 n50. 
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building and foreign affairs, indicating that their reports from the Netherlands would not 
be taken lightly and could prove of significant importance to the United States. 
Between 1780 and 1801 these three ministers sent home countless letters – a great 
deal of which was probably lost at sea – and diligently kept diaries. They regularly 
reported to their superiors – including the Secretary of State, the President of Congress, 
and the President of the United States – about the political situation in Europe and the 
Netherlands, and how it could affect the United States and its policies. Besides the 
official correspondence between the diplomats and government officials, private 
correspondence and diaries also play a significant role in this research. In the eighteenth 
century private correspondence networks enabled people to have confidence in the 
information transmitted over great distance. They developed communities underpinned 
by trust and knit together by so-called strong ties, such as a long-term friendship or 
family alliance – as opposed to so-called weak ties, such as with acquaintances and 
associates. Thus in their private letters and diaries the diplomats are often more honest 
and unrestrained than in their letters to their superiors, unraveling to us their passions, 
hopes, and disappointments. It shows us “the rich particularity of experience” and “the 
piquant aroma of life”.10 Additionally, sociological theory argues that in studying and 
portraying another nation, people often expose themselves. They appraise others by their 
own standards and try to fit them into their own framework and view of the world. In 
other words, what the diplomats feared or admired about Europe and the Netherlands 
reveals what they believed to be most important to them and the United States; what they 
believed the American nation should aim for or avoid.
11
 Investigating the official and 
private correspondence of these three diplomats provides an insight into what 
preoccupied the minds of eighteenth-century Americans. Through the eyes of American 
diplomats in the Netherlands we can uncover how eighteenth-century Americans viewed 
Europe and what they could learn from the events in the Netherlands.  
 
                                                 
10
 D.J. Boorstin, America and the Image of Europe: reflections on American thought (Cleveland 1960), 66-
67; Van Minnen, Yankees onder de zeespiegel, 9; N. Perl-Rosenthal, ‘Private Letters and Public 
Diplomacy: The Adams Network and the Quasi-War, 1797–1798’, Journal of the Early Republic 31:2 
(Summer 2011), 283-311. 
11
 A.N.J. den Hollander, Visie en Verantwoording. Socoliogische essays over het eigene en het andere 
(Assen 1968) 14-16; C. Strout, The American Image of the Old World (New York and London 1963), ix-
xiii. 
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Filling a gap 
Despite the apparent importance of the Netherlands to the United States – most notably as 
an important listening-post in Europe – between 1780 and 1801, not much has been 
written on how the Netherlands could serve as an example to the United States. The few 
studies that do focus on this time period are limited to Dutch influences on the 
establishment of the American Constitution in 1787-89.
12
 Moreover, previous studies of 
Dutch-American relations in the eighteenth century tend to ignore or overlook the 
diplomatic relations between 1780 and 1801. They primarily focus on economic and 
trade relations or on diplomatic relations up to the Dutch recognition of American 
independence in 1782. Yet, the political situation in Europe and the Netherlands was 
becoming increasingly important to the United States as it could affect American politics 
as well. Maintaining diplomatic relations between the United States and the Netherlands 
was then an important way for the American government to stay informed about 
European affairs.   
Historical works from the first half of the twentieth century do not provide an in-
depth or satisfactory analysis of diplomatic relations between the United States and the 
Dutch Republic. They tend to consider Dutch-American relations as a small part within 
another more important framework of diplomacy and foreign relations.
13
 The most 
prominent of these works are Samuel Flagg Bemis’s The Diplomacy of the American 
Revolution (1935) and A Diplomatic History of the United States (1950), which focus on 
the relations of the United States with European superpowers such as France, Britain, and 
Spain. The European wars in which those powers were involved significantly influenced 
American foreign policy, and thus in turn influenced Dutch-American relations – which 
                                                 
12
 L.S. Kaplan, ‘The Founding Fathers and the Two Confederations: The United States of America and the 
United Provinces of the Netherlands, 1783-89’, in: J.W. Schulte Nordholt en R.P. Swierenga (eds.), A 
Bilaterial Bicentennial: a history of Dutch-American relations, 1782-1982 (New York and Amsterdam 
1982) 33-48; W.H. Riker, ‘Dutch and American Federalism’, Journal of the History of Ideas 18 (1957), 
495-521; J.W. Schulte Nordholt, ‘The Example of the Dutch Republic for American Federalism’, in: J.C. 
Boogman and G.N. van der Plaat, Federalism: History and Current Significance of a Form of 
Government (Den Haag 1980), 437-49. 
13
 The earliest of these works are Edler’s The Dutch Republic and the American Revolution (1911) and 
Westermann’s The Netherlands and the United States (1935). Though the title indicates differently, Edler is 
primarily interested in the relations between the Dutch Republic and Britain. The United States is only 
introduced as a section of that framework. Westermann’s work only briefly discusses Dutch-American 
relations in the eighteenth century as a prologue to the more important nineteenth century. 
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can only be understood within this bigger picture.
14
 Like most historians of his time, 
Bemis does not study the Dutch-American relationship in its own right. In contrast, Van 
Wijk’s De Republiek en Amerika (1921) is primarily interested in the relations between 
the Dutch Republic and the United States. But this study is limited to pamphlets as 
indicators of foreign relations and otherwise provides a shallow analysis of diplomatic 
relations.
15
 
James Hutson justly argues that prior to about 1980 American historians have not 
given the Dutch role in the American Revolution the attention that it deserves, and that 
Dutch historians have not shown much interest in their country’s efforts to establish 
relations with the new American state. Only the bicentennial of the Dutch recognition of 
American independence in 1982 would provide renewed interest in the Dutch-American 
relations. From around 1980 historians started to pay more attention to the diplomatic 
missions on both sides of the Atlantic.
16
  
But even the works since then are primarily interested in either trade relations
17
 or 
the diplomatic relations up to only 1782.
18
 C.A. van Minnen does discuss the diplomatic 
missions between 1780 and 1801, but only briefly as a prologue to his study of the 
Dutch-American diplomatic relations in the nineteenth century.
19
 It is true that R.R. 
Palmer incorporates John Quincy Adams in his study of Dutch-American diplomatic 
relations. He compares the diplomatic missions of John Adams and his son, and 
                                                 
14
 S.F. Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution (New York 1935) 176-7; S.F. Bemis, A 
Diplomatic History of the United States (New York 1950) 30-31, 43-44, 94-5. 
15
 F.W. van Wijk, De Republiek en Amerika, 1776 tot 1782 (Leiden 1921). 
16
 J.H. Hutson, ‘John Adams and the Birth of Dutch-American Friendship, 1780-1782’, in: J.W. Schulte 
Nordholt en R.P. Swierenga (eds.), A Bilaterial Bicentennial: a history of Dutch-American relations, 1782-
1982 (New York and Amsterdam 1982) 19-20. 
17
 See J.C. Riley, ‘Foreign Credit and Fiscal Stability: Dutch Investment in the United States, 1781-1794’, 
The Journal of American History 65:3 (Dec. 1978) 654-78; J.C. Riley, ‘Financial and Economic Ties: The 
First Century’, in: J.W. Schulte Nordholt en R.P. Swierenga (eds.), A Bilaterial Bicentennial : a history of 
Dutch-American relations, 1782-1982 (New York and Amsterdam 1982) 49-65; G.M. Welling, The prize 
of neutrality: trade relations between Amsterdam and North America 1771-1817, A Computational Study 
(Groningen 1998); R.D. Congelton, ‘America’s neglected debt to the Dutch, an institutional perspective’, 
Constitutional Political Economy 19:1 (2008), 35-59. 
18
 J.W. Schulte Nordholt and J.H. Hutson focus on the diplomatic mission of John Adams and end their 
study with the recognition of American independence in 1782. J.H. Hutson, John Adams and the Diplomacy of the 
American Revolution (Lexington 1980); Hutson, ‘John Adams and the Birth of Dutch-American Friendship’, 
19-32; J.W. Schulte Nordholt, Voorbeeld in de Verte: De invloed van de Amerikaanse revolutie in 
Nederland (Baarn 1979). 
19
 C.A. van Minnen, ‘Dutch-American Diplomatic Relations’, in: H. Krabbedam, C.A. van Minnen, and G. 
Scott-Smith (eds.), Four Centuries of Dutch-American Relations (Middelburg 2009) 260-261; Van Minnen, 
Yankees onder de zeespiegel, 22-27. 
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concludes that while the senior Adams felt sympathetic for the Patriot cause the junior 
Adams kept his distance from Dutch politics. But how this shaped or influenced any form 
of diplomacy is left in the dark.
20
 Even such a seminal work as Four Centuries of Dutch-
American relations, 1609-2009 (2009) only spends one 15-page essay on Dutch-
American relations between 1780 and 1801. But even that essay by Wayne te Brake 
focuses on Dutch and American political situations separately and Dutch-American trade 
relations, and pays little attention to diplomatic relations and missions.
21
  
To be sure, historians have studied the diplomatic missions of John Quincy 
Adams and William Vans Murray to the Netherlands. Their missions appear to have been 
studied as a necessary – yet not essential – part of their biographies, but not in their own 
right within the context of Dutch-American relations and American foreign policy. For 
instance, in the case of John Quincy historians are more concerned with his time as 
Secretary of State and President, of which Bemis’s John Quincy Adams and the 
Foundation of American Foreign Policy (1949) is a good example. In this work John 
Quincy’s diplomatic mission to the Netherlands is merely considered as a stepping stone 
towards the more important public offices later in his life. In the case of Murray, 
historians are more interested in his role during the peace negotiations with France in 
1800. Only Hill’s biography of Murray seems to seriously discuss his time in the 
Netherlands.
22
 The diplomatic missions are not discussed within the context of American 
foreign policy or Dutch-American relations.  
There appears to be a gap in the literature of Dutch-American diplomatic relations 
between 1782 and 1801, and this study could then complement the existing literature. 
This thesis attempts to provide an overview and a more complete picture of Dutch-
American diplomatic relations in the final decades of the eighteenth century, focusing on 
what the Netherlands meant to eighteenth-century Americans and the newly formed 
United States.  
                                                 
20
 R.R. Palmer, ‘Two Americans in Two Dutch Republics : The Adamses, Father and Son’, in: J.W. Schulte 
Nordholt en R.P. Swierenga (eds.), A Bilaterial Bicentennial : a history of Dutch-American relations, 1782-
1982 (New York and Amsterdam 1982), 7-8, 12-13. 
21
 W. te Brake, ‘The Dutch Republic and the Creation of the United States’, in: H. Krabbedam, C.A. van 
Minnen, and G. Scott-Smith (eds.), Four Centuries of Dutch-American Relations (Middelburg 2009), 204-
18. 
22
 P.P. Hill, William Vans Murray, Federalist Diplomat (Syracuse, NY 1971). 
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Prologue: American Diplomacy and Foreign Policy 
 
Republican ideal of independence 
In 1776 American colonists knew they were not merely replacing monarchy with an 
elective system of government. They were well aware that their experiment in 
republicanism was bold and potentially world changing. Americans had made a 
significant change from “subjects to citizens. (…) Subjects look up to a master, but 
citizens are so far equal, that none have hereditary rights superior to others.”23  The 
American republic would hold itself together from the bottom up. The new American 
nation would build on the citizens’ willingness to defend their country and their 
willingness to sacrifice private desires for the sake of the public good. The republican 
experiment relied on the belief that Americans possessed a common moral and social 
sense.
24
 
Only independence from the Old World could guarantee the success of the 
republican experiment. In at least the second half of the eighteenth century Americans 
considered the Old World of Europe and the New World of the United States not so much 
as different geographical locations but more as logical antitheses contrasting in ideas, 
values, and institutions.
25
 Americans repeatedly told themselves that they had abandoned 
the bloody barbarism and savage violence of the Old World. They were confident that 
their society was becoming more civilized and sophisticated, but of course not to the 
point reached by the decadent Old World. It is precisely because Americans lacked the 
corrupting luxury of Europe, John Adams noted, that “the Civilization of America (…) is 
Superiour to that of Europe”. The American people may have lacked the fine arts of 
Europe but in all other matters, especially agriculture, commerce, and government, they 
were superior. “In this respect America is infinitely further removed from Barbarity, than 
Europe.”26  The social distinctions between the wealthy few and the poverty-stricken 
many so evident in European society were absent from the American environment. The 
                                                 
23
 D. Ramsay, A Dissertation of the Manner of Acquiring the Character and Privileges of a Citizen of the 
United States (1789), 3. 
24
 G.S. Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815 (New York 2009), 7-11. 
25
 Boorstin, America and the Image of Europe, 19-20; Strout, The American Image of the Old World, ix-xii 
26
 JA, Translation of Thomas Pownall’s Memorial (1780), PJA 9:199. 
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fact that the great bulk of Americans were landowners radically separated them from the 
rest of the world. The American environment was ideally suited for republicanism. To 
Americans it seemed they were born to be independent citizens.
27
 As an independent 
nation the United States learned to fend for itself. Precisely because Americans were 
separated from Europe and “remote from all other aid, we are obliged to invent and 
execute; to find means within ourselves, and not to lean on others”.28 
The new American nation established a policy of free trade avoiding military 
foreign alliances. The United States wanted to achieve an independent existence, secure 
from the corrupting influence of Europe. Foreign alliances would only, and inevitably, 
drag the country into European wars, weakening the country and damaging its commerce 
in the process. A weakened United States was susceptible to foreign intervention and 
domination, something Americans had already experienced at the hands of Great Britain 
and thus sought to avoid. Americans believed that commercial conventions and 
agreements were sources of friction and political conflict. In order to avoid such conflicts, 
and thus remain neutral and independent, the United States wanted to establish a 
commercial system of free trade. Such a system would eliminate all cause for tension and 
political conflicts.
29
 
The policy of non-intervention was followed during the war with Britain and 
during, at least, the presidencies of George Washington and John Adams. Soon after the 
United States declared itself independent in 1776 Congressman John Adams, who was 
considered the most knowledgeable person when it comes to foreign relations, was 
assigned the task to set up a draft treaty – called the Model Treaty – which could be used 
as a blueprint for future treaties. The Model Treaty was intended to promote free trade, 
while avoiding any political connections with foreign powers. The United States intended 
to remain neutral from European politics and wars. Presidents Washington and Adams 
would more than once do everything in their power to avoid conflict with European 
powers. Washington’s Farewell Address of 1796 best conveys the American non-
intervention policy: 
                                                 
27
 Wood, Empire of Liberty, 43-46. 
28
 Thomas Jefferson to Martha Jefferson, 28 March 1787, Papers of Thomas Jefferson 11:251. 
29
 F. Gilbert, To the Farewell Address: ideas of early American foreign policy (Princeton University Press 
1961), 44-54. 
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The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is in extending our 
commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. 
Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote 
relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies the causes of 
which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise 
in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her 
politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or 
enmities. 
 
Involvement with European affairs would only bring ruin to the United States and the 
American government should therefore steer clear of “permanent alliances with any 
portion of the foreign world”.30 
 
The United States joins the balance of power 
In the United States there existed a consensus on how to conduct foreign policy, which 
was based on the European notions that there existed a balance of power among nations –
that no one nation should be able to overpower the rest – and that every nation acted out 
of self-interest. Americans had become familiar with these ideas as former citizens of the 
British Empire and adopted them because during the American Revolution they 
subscribed to a theory of politics set forth by English Opposition writers, which 
proclaimed that every political controversy could be explained as an imbalance of power. 
An important characteristic of American foreign policy was the thought that this delicate 
European balance of power could be carefully manipulated and be used to the advantage 
of the United States.
31
 
Americans came to believe that they played an essential role in the balance of 
power. During every crisis between Britain and France in the New World, the American 
colonies were fervently defended by the British. The British feared that if the American 
                                                 
30
 Washington, ‘Farewell Address’, 76-77. A more detailed account of American suspicion of external 
threat can be found in J.H. Hutson, ‘The Origins of The Paranoid Style in American Politics’: Public 
Jealousy from the Age of Walpole to the Age of Jackson’, in: Hall, Murrin, and Tate (eds.), Saints and 
Revolutionaries: Essays on Early American History (New York and London, 1984), 332-72. 
31
 Bemis, Diplomacy of the American Revolution, 13-15; Hutson, John Adams and Diplomacy, 1-3; Gilbert, 
To the Farewell Address, 89-98; Van Minnen, Yankees onder de zeepsiegel, 10. 
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colonies would fall into French hands, they would lose their naval dominance and the 
balance of power would shift in favor of France. Consequently, Americans started to 
believe that whoever controlled the American colonies, or had sole trading privileges 
with them, dominated naval commerce and therefore also the European balance of 
power.
32
  
The Model Treaty indicates how the United States attempted to use the balance of 
power for its own benefit. The goal of the Model Treaty was to dissolve the British trade 
monopoly of American commerce and invite all nations, including Britain, to trade with 
the United States on equal terms. Creating a system of free trade between the United 
States and Europe, instead of a trade monopoly, would maintain a balance of power. 
Britain would lose its trade monopoly and naval dominance, while other European 
powers such as France gained the opportunity to challenge British naval hegemony. 
Furthermore, free trade would provide the basis for a friendly relationship with both 
Britain and France, thus providing the opportunity to call on their support when the other 
attempted to subjugate the American colonies. American independence could then be 
ensured.
33
 
 
American foreign policy and the Dutch Republic  
The period of gradual estrangement from Britain after 1763 was a critical stage in the 
development of American diplomacy. The American colonists’ sense of affinity with 
Britain was fading, and cries for independence were becoming louder and more 
widespread. In the months following the battles at Lexington and Concord on 19 April 
1775 the Continental Congress assumed the character of a working government and 
began to treat Britain as a hostile foreign power. The necessity of taking common action 
in response to British provocation drew together the thirteen separate colonies, which had 
in many ways closer links with Britain that with each other.  
The decision to establish sources of communication and intelligence in Europe, 
most notably Britain and the Netherlands, was a part of that process. The American 
colonies were desperate for any foreign aid in their struggle against Britain. Unwilling as 
                                                 
32
 Bemis, Diplomacy of the American Revolution, 3-5; Hutson, John Adams and Diplomacy, 3-11. 
33
 Hutson, John Adams and Diplomacy, 26-32; Van Minnen, Yankees onder de zeespiegel, 10. 
17 
 
yet to send ambassadors abroad, the Continental Congress voted to appoint a committee 
to correspond with “friends” in Britain and elsewhere on 29 November 1775. By creating 
such institutions the colonies initiated a process of nation building and organized 
diplomacy.
34
 
On the following day the new Committee of Secret Correspondence notified 
Arthur Lee, a former colonial agent in London, of his appointment as a representative in 
Britain. Ten days later Benjamin Franklin, one of the committee members, wrote a 
similar letter to a correspondent in the Dutch Republic: Charles William Frédéric Dumas. 
Franklin had become acquainted with Dumas in 1767 and witnessed his favorable 
disposition toward liberty and the struggle of the American colonies. Residing in The 
Hague, a place where “Ambassadors from all the Courts reside”, Dumas was requested to 
make use of such a situation and gather information on the disposition of European 
countries concerning an alliance of friendship with the American government.
35
 
By 1777 rumours had reached the Continental Congress, and John Adams as a 
member, of the possibility of Dutch support for American independence, or at least of 
antipathy towards Britain’s rule of the seas.36 Whether such rumours were authentic or 
false, it was easy for Americans to believe that the Dutch Republic would show support. 
After all, it was a confederation of states that had fought off tyranny and won freedom 
from a foreign, imperial ruler and was primarily governed by a representative body: the 
States-General. In July of that year Congress briefly considered sending an American 
representative to the United Provinces, but this was eventually postponed because 
Congress wanted to know for certain the sentiments of the Dutch government 
beforehand. Like most monarchs in Europe the Dutch Stadtholder, a hereditary head of 
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state tasked with maintaining peace and order in the Dutch Republic, disapproved of a 
revolt against the sovereignty of a legitimate monarch – fearing that his own claim to the 
throne would be jeopardized. Very few European monarchs were prepared to recognize a 
rebel American diplomat.
37
 Furthermore, the Stadtholder had political and family ties 
with the British Crown. Congress feared that “possibly their connections with England, 
might make receiving an American Minister, as yet inconvenient, and (…) a little 
embarrassing”.38 For now no official representative would be sent to the Dutch Republic. 
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Chapter 1: John Adams, 1780-1782 
 
 
 
John Adams, engraving by Reinier Vinkeles, 1782 
 
 
John Adams (1735 – 1826) came to prominence during the early stages of the American 
Revolution. The revolutionary events he experienced as a lawyer in Boston would shape 
him into one of the most important and influential Founding Fathers. From 1774 to 1777 
John represented Massachusetts in the Continental Congress, where he was an avid 
proponent of declaring independence. In later years he was sent on several diplomatic 
missions to Europe, including to France and the Netherlands, to secure peace and sign 
treaties.  
20 
 
 Throughout his life John spent many hours studying history and the science of 
government. His ruling dogma was balance. The equilibrium of king, lords, and 
commons that had characterized the English constitution was a shining example of a 
mixed government. It was the royal government that had corrupted it and paved the way 
for tyranny. A perfectly balanced constitution and government would save the United 
States from a tyranny of one person or many. Adams published his thoughts in several 
influential works, such as Thoughts on Government (1776) and A Defence of the 
Constitutions of Government of the United States (1787), and brought them into practice 
when drafting the Massachusetts Constitution (1780).  
 John’s credentials as a revolutionary and political theorist secured him two terms 
as Washington’s vice president from 1789 to 1796 and one term as President from 1796 
to 1800. During his Presidency he continued Washington’s policy of neutrality. John 
chose to pursue a course he thought best for the nation, though it was fraught with 
personal political dangers. He encountered fierce attacks from Jeffersonian Republicans, 
as well as opposition from his own Federalist Party led by Alexander Hamilton. After 
losing the Presidential elections to Thomas Jefferson in 1800 he retired to 
Massachusetts.
39
 
 
 
1.1 – Missions to Paris 
 
Even though Congress did not yet send a representative to the Dutch Republic in 1777, 
Adams did not forget about the possibilities of allying the Dutch. He had started reading 
Dutch history, particularly Cardinal Bentivoglio’s History of the Wars in Flanders (1654, 
translated in 1678), and noted the remarkable similarities between the American cause 
and the Dutch revolt. John, like many Americans, felt sympathy and connectedness with 
the Dutch people.
40
 But before he could act on these sympathies John was sent on two 
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missions to Paris, first from April 1778 to August 1779 and then from November 1779 to 
July 1780.  
 On his first mission to Paris in the spring of 1778 John replaced Silas Deane as 
member of a diplomatic commission alongside Benjamin Franklin and Arthur Lee, a 
position which did not suit him. He soon learned that quarrels and disputes caused 
“Parties and Divisions among the Americans” in France. The three commissioners hardly 
attended the same social gatherings or meetings. Even after Deane had returned to the 
United States the quarrels did not stop, as he accused John of conspiring to steal his 
commission and accused Arthur Lee of being in contact with the British. In the spring of 
1779 John was relieved of his commission and left frustrated, only to return a year later 
to negotiate a peace with Britain and face the same difficulties as before.
41
 John believed 
that divisions among the commissioners “must have disagreeable if not pernicious 
effects” on the diplomatic mission, but more importantly on American credibility and 
reputation. Conflicts among the envoys expose weaknesses and divisions, and undermine 
any displays of unity and strength. Such circumstances limit the possibilities of procuring 
foreign aid and are “ruinous to the American Cause”. John tried to remain “wholly 
untainted by these Prejudices”.42  
 While John insistently avoided the “incessant dinners and dissipations” of French 
elite society, Franklin seemed to feel comfortable in that environment.
43
 Franklin did his 
best to fit in and played the role expected of him by Vergennes, the French Minister of 
Foreign Affairs. Franklin did not want to push too hard on the American ally and 
believed the French court should be treated with “decency and delicacy”. It was 
Franklin’s intention “to procure what Advantages I can for our Country, by endeavouring 
to please this Court”.44  To John this strategy seemed passive and showed a lack of 
interest. Franklin was not sufficiently pressing France to adequately aid the United States. 
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It appeared that instead of fulfilling his duties, Franklin was preoccupied with indolence 
and debauchery. John even accused the “old conjuror” of living a “fullsome and sickish” 
life of leisure.
45
  
 Yet, the disunity among the American commissioners and Franklin’s behavior 
were not what was damaging the American cause the most; it was France’s sinister 
design to influence American policy. John was initially convinced that France had a 
benevolent disposition toward the American cause. France was “a Rock upon which we 
can safely build” and “the only Foundation on which our Union can rest securely”.46 Due 
to the war between Britain and the United States an “incurable animosity” would persist 
for generations between both countries.
47
 Because Britain had become a natural enemy to 
the United States, and had been France’s enemy for centuries, John had “the strongest 
reasons to depend upon the friendship and alliance of France”. He was convinced that the 
United States “will be for ages the natural bulwark of France” and France in turn will be 
“the natural defence of the United States” against the hostile and rapacious spirit of 
Britain.
48
  
 John soon became convinced that the situation in France was not what it initially 
seemed to be. At first he believed that an alliance with France would bring a swift end to 
the war with Britain. But his hopes of an early peace dissipated by the end of 1778, and 
John grew concerned about the usefulness of an alliance with France. For the first time he 
spoke of the alliance as “a delicate and dangerous connection”. He expressed fear that 
France doubted the military capability and economic stability of the United States, and 
that France was beginning to treat the United States as a second-class partner. French 
officials would not share intelligence on British military plans nor would they consult on 
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joint military operations. John warned that France might seek to influence American 
foreign policy “by attaching themselves to Persons, Parties, or Measures in America”.49 
 John was convinced that Franklin’s method of “decent and delicate” diplomacy 
was only furthering France’s plan. His diplomacy of gratitude would unavoidably give 
France too much leeway to influence American policy. John believed that anything but an 
equal friendship with France would ruin the United States and its goals. In his draft of the 
Model Treaty John had already insisted that only dealing with European powers on equal 
terms could prevent a repeat of British colonial rule. So if the United States were to 
continue to play the part of a grateful servant, Britain would have merely been replaced 
by France and the United States would still not be independent. While Franklin sincerely 
believed in the “generous benevolence” of the French, John was convinced that French 
support for the American cause was not an act of altruism. It was only “because England 
is the natural Ennemy of France, that America in her present situation is her natural 
Friend”. 50  Despite Vergennes’s arguments that France was making war only for the 
United States and that their “causes are now common causes never to be separated”, John 
believed that beneath Vergennes’s diplomatic style there appeared to lurk a sinister 
design to reduce him – and America – to a demeaning dependency.51 
John’s objective became to banish gratitude from the diplomatic dialogue between 
France and the United States. John believed the American independence played a 
decisive role in the European balance of power in favor of the French and at the expense 
of the British. Britain’s strength “had become so terrible to France and would soon have 
been so fatal to her” that American independence worked in favor of France. The French 
would not have been so powerful “without the Seperation of America from Great Britain 
                                                 
49
 J. Ferling, ‘John Adams, Diplomat’, The William and Mary Quarterly, 15:2 (Apr. 1994), 233; JA to 
Samuel Adams, 27 Nov. 1778, PJA 7:234; JA to Gerry, 5 Dec. 1778, PJA 7:248; JA to Roger Sherman, 6 
Dec. 1778, PJA 7:254; JA to Samuel Adams, 14 Feb. 1779, PJA 8: 413. 
50
 Ferling, John Adams, 225-26; JA to S. Adams, 27 Feb. 1779, PJA 7:413. 
51
 Ferling, John Adams, 201-3; Hutson, John Adams and Diplomacy, 71-2. Vergennes to Gerard (French 
minister to the U.S.), 22 Apr. 1778, cited by Hutson, John Adams and Diplomacy, 17 and Bemis, 
Diplomacy of the American Revolution, 18n. Examples of JA’s belief that France is self-interested and 
wants to make the United States dependent upon French gratitude can be found in: JA to S. Adams, 27 Feb. 
1779 PJA 7:413; JA, Diary, 28 Aug. 1780, DAJA 2:446; JA to Abigail Adams, 18 Dec. 1780, AFC 4:35. 
24 
 
and her Alliance with France”.52 As a result John believed that the United States did not 
have to approach France with a servant’s trembling gratitude but was justified in treating 
her as an equal. John feared that if the United States continued to play the role of 
obedient servant “too much will be demanded of us” and that France “may have too 
much influence in our deliberations”.53  
This fear of dependence would be the driving force behind John’s departure to the 
Dutch Republic in the summer of 1780. Rather than staying in France, John thought he 
would be of more use by procuring a loan from Dutch bankers and diminishing the 
United States’ dependence on the French. When John eventually left for the Dutch 
Republic Franklin reported to Congress that he went to try “whether something might not 
be done to render [Congress] less dependent on France”. Believing “that America has 
been too free in expressions of gratitude to France; for that she is more obliged to us than 
we to her; and that we should show spirit in our applications”.54 Being solely dependent 
upon France, John believed, would cause French dominance over American foreign and 
internal policy.  
 
Desire to remain independent from Europe 
John’s experiences in France intensified his belief that the United States should remain 
independent from Europe – a belief he had continuously voiced as a member of Congress 
and had put into practice while drafting the Model Treaty. Although John was convinced 
that all the European powers rejoiced in the American cause, he believed that none of 
them “wishes to see America rise very fast to power”. It seems the European powers 
supported American independence in order to restore a balance of power by damaging 
the British naval hegemony, not to let the United States replace Britain. John was 
convinced that the European powers were entirely self-interested, only caring about their 
own power and influence and not about the liberties of the American or European people. 
The actions of France had made this perfectly clear to him. John argued that the United 
States should “above all things avoid as much as possible entangling ourselves with 
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[European] war and politics. (…) America has been the sport of European wars and 
politics long enough.”55  
 John was also convinced that the United States should shy away from European 
cultural influences, fearing the impact Europe would have on Americans. He wrote to his 
wife that “there is everything here that can inform understanding, or refine the taste, and 
indeed one would think that could purify the heart. Yet it must be remembered there is 
everything here, too, which can seduce, betray, deceive, corrupt and debauch.”56 When 
the young New England merchant Elkanah Watson wrote to inquire what sort of manners 
he should cultivate in anticipation of touring Europe, John advised him “to cultivate the 
manners of your own country, not those of Europe”.57 It was the honourable and virtuous 
character of the American people that would bring him success in life, not corrupted 
European manners.  
 
 
1.2 – Growing interest in the Dutch Republic 
 
During his missions in France John had not forgotten about the possibilities of a Dutch 
alliance and had learned a great deal more about the Dutch Republic. For instance, he 
stated that “in Holland there is more friendship for us, than I was aware before I came to 
France”.58 On his way back home in the summer of 1779 he yearned to go to the Dutch 
Republic and wrote that his “own inclinations would have led me to Holland: But I 
thought my honour concerned to return directly home”. 59  Soon after returning to 
Braintree he noted in his diplomatic statement to Congress that he thought an alliance 
between the Dutch and American republics was possible and useful. He stressed the 
similarities of religion, constitutions, the fight for independence and most of all “the 
attractions of commercial interests” between the two republics. A representative should 
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be sent to the Dutch Republic with full powers and clear instructions for borrowing 
money.
60
  
 John believed he was perfectly qualified for such a job, even writing to a friend in 
Congress that he would not mind a commission to Holland without added pay – next to 
his existing commission in France to negotiate a peace with England.
61
 Nevertheless, on 
21 October 1779 Congress chose Henry Laurens.
62
 But for whatever reasons, Laurens did 
not sail for Europe until the fall of 1780 and was then captured by the British. Between 
the time of Laurens’s appointment and his departure rumours accumulated both in France 
and the United States that the relationship between the Dutch and British governments 
was deteriorating – a recurrent theme in John’s dispatches to Congress throughout the 
spring of 1780. John noted that “it looks as if England would force the Dutch into the 
War, but if they take a Part it will certainly be for Us. Oh that Laurens were there. Oh that 
Laurens were there!”63 By 20 June Congress felt it should not waste more time and 
empowered John, or alternatively his friend and colleague Francis Dana, to act in 
Laurens’s place in obtaining a Dutch loan until Laurens himself arrived.64  
By the time this news reached John – a letter was only sent 11 July – he had 
already decided to pay a visit to the Dutch Republic. John left on 27 July so he “might 
form some acquaintances or correspondences there and collect some intelligence that 
might be useful the United States”. 65  During his stay in the Dutch Republic John 
industriously gathered and transmitted intelligence for Congress. Notable historians of 
American diplomacy considered eighteenth-century The Hague a sort of listening post for 
European politics in general.
66
 Also, John himself stated about The Hague that “there is 
not in Europe a better Station to collect Intelligence, (…) not a better Situation from 
whence to circulate Intelligence, through all parts of Europe, than this”.67 From there he 
could not only gather information about the Dutch disposition towards the American 
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cause, but he could also learn of the dispositions of other European countries and have 
“Influence upon the publick opinions of several Nations”.68 After a couple of months in 
the Dutch Republic John told Franklin that it is “of vast importance to us, to obtain an 
acknowledgment of our independence from as many other sovereigns as possible”, even 
calling it the “end and aim of his existence”. International recognition of American 
independence would improve the bargaining position of the United States in peace 
negotiations with Britain.
69
  
John argued that the Dutch were fed lies by British agents about the American 
cause. As early as 1777 Dumas reported that the Dutch people “complain everywhere of 
knowing nothing of [American] affairs, but what the English wish Europe should know; 
and on this subject we have often to wait some months before the truth is unfolded from a 
heap of impostures”.70 Educating the Dutch would increase the possibilities of procuring 
a loan, and save the American cause from its demise. During his first few months in the 
United Provinces John observed the extensive British propaganda machine and noted the 
“ignorance of America”. In a letter to Congress he described a situation in which “there 
have been Persons enough employed and well paid by our Ennemies, to propagate 
Misinformation, Misrepresentation, and Abuse”. “Swarms of Agents” were propagating 
the British side, yet there was nobody “to turn the Attention of the Publick towards 
[American] Affairs”.71 John states that the Dutch Republic “had been grossly deceived”. 
The Dutch people have little knowledge of the wealth and resources of the United States, 
and believe England is more powerful than it actually is.
72
 He concluded that  
 
it is necessary for America to have Agents in different parts of Europe, to 
give some Information concerning our affairs, and to refute the abominable 
Lies that the hired Emissaries of Great Britain circulate in every Corner of 
Europe. (…) The universal and profound Ignorance of America here, has 
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astonished me. It will require Time, and a great deal of Prudence and 
Delicacy too to undeceive them.
 73
 
 
During his stay in the Dutch Republic John was very active as a publicist and a 
propagandist for the American cause by composing communications for 
publication in French, Dutch, and British newspapers.
74
  
 
Suspicious of Franklin and Vergennes 
John’s departure to the Netherlands was resisted by both Franklin and Vergennes. In the 
past Franklin had continuously opposed sending a minister to multiple European courts, 
including the Dutch Republic. As early as 1777 Franklin was of the opinion “that a 
Virgin State should preserve the Virgin Character, and not go about suitoring for 
Alliances, but wait with decent Dignity for the Applications of others”. 75  Franklin 
opposed John’s mission to the United Provinces writing to John that he has “long been 
humiliated with the Idea of our running about from Court to Court begging for Money 
and Friendship”.76 John felt the same “mortification of soliciting for money” as Franklin, 
but argued that there was no reason to be ashamed of borrowing money to maintain a war 
that had been going on for six years against an enemy that did the same.
77
 But John 
believed there was a sinister design behind Franklin’s desire to limit the number of 
American diplomats in Europe and his objection to John’s departure to the Dutch 
Republic. John believed that Franklin sought more power and wanted to “sweep Europe 
clear of every Minister but himself”.78  
John was also suspicious of Vergennes, who he believed was merely aiding the 
American cause out of self-interest and wanted to keep the United States dependent upon 
French gratitude. John reported that France’s desire to continue the war was waning and 
that France would exit the war as soon as possible. He feared for the success of the 
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American cause and intended to seek aid outside France. Initially Vergennes refused to 
give John a passport to travel to the Dutch Republic, but he eventually accepted John’s 
requests to avoid angering the American government. A Dutch loan would, after all, 
make the United States less dependent on France: something John desired and Vergennes 
hoped to avoid.
79
 
John was convinced that he was constantly being pursued by spies, including 
those of Franklin and Vergennes. The capitals of Europe were full of international agents, 
constantly informing their superiors on every important action and event.
80
 As early as 
1779 John informed his wife that “there are Spies upon every Word I utter, and every 
Syllable I write—Spies planted by the English—Spies planted by Stockjobbers—Spies 
planted by selfish Merchants—and Spies planted by envious and malicious Politicians”.81 
During his stay in France John “was afraid to keep a journal” because he believed that 
“the house was full of spies, some of whom were among my own servants”.82 Even in the 
Dutch Republic, away from Franklin and Vergennes, John did not feel safe. He “was 
pursued into Holland by the intrigues of Vergennes and Franklin, and was embarrassed 
and thwarted, both in my negotiations for a loan and in those of a political nature, by their 
friends, agents, and spies, as much, at least, as I ever had been in France”.83  
Despite being suspicious of Franklin and Vergennes, John was never hostile in his 
correspondence to Vergennes and Franklin and did not complain about either of them to 
Congress prior to his departure to the Netherlands. But in the summer of 1780 a chain of 
events culminated in a serious rift with both Vergennes and Franklin, confirming and 
intensifying John’s suspicions. In March 1780 Congress had devaluated the dollar in a 
desperate measure to curb rampant inflation. France was unhappy about the measure, and 
Vergennes informed John that France opposed any revaluation of American currency 
unless an exception was made for French merchants. Vergennes portrayed the measure as 
an act of bad faith towards France, implying it would have serious consequences for their 
alliance. John, already convinced that France intended to keep the United States 
                                                 
79
 Ferling, John Adams, 229; Ferling, ‘John Adams, Diplomat’, 237-245; Hutson, John Adams and 
Diplomacy, 66; Adams to Elbridge Gerry, 18 Oct. 1779, PJA 8:213. 
80
 Bemis, Diplomacy of the American Revolution, 13-15; JA to Robert Livingston, 14 Feb. 1782, PJA 
12:233-35. 
81
 JA to Abigail Adams, 20 Feb. 1779, AFC 3:174. 
82
 JA, Autobiography, DAJA 4:78. 
83
 JA to Marcy Warren, 3 Aug. 1807, quoted in Hutson, John Adams and Diplomacy, 88. 
30 
 
dependent upon French gratitude, could not accept such requests. He argued that France 
and the United States were equals and that France should not receive any preferential 
treatment.  
A frustrated Vergennes had had enough: he closed all communications with John 
and henceforth only dealt with Franklin. Moreover, Vergennes tried to have John 
recalled. Vergennes directed the French minister in Philadelphia to see what could be 
done to have John recalled. Simultaneously, Vergennes sent his correspondence with 
John to Franklin, asking him to inform Congress of John’s insubordinate behavior 
towards France. Franklin could have merely forwarded John’s letters, but instead added a 
letter of his own to Congress. It appears Franklin was also fed up with John. Franklin 
knew perfectly well that his letter was a devastating indictment, stating that “Mr. Adams 
has given extreme offense to the court here”. Franklin believed the French “court is to be 
treated with decency and delicacy” and that “an expression of gratitude is not only our 
duty, but our interest”.84 
John’s experiences in France had made him suspicious of Franklin and 
Vergennes, and their actions in the summer of 1780 increased these suspicions. He was 
now fully convinced that Franklin and Vergennes were working together to remove him 
from Europe and, more importantly, to increase French influence on American policy. 
During his mission in the Dutch Republic Franklin’s and Vergennes’s malignant plan 
continued to undermine John actions, or so he believed.   
 
 
1.3 – John Adams in the Dutch Republic 
 
John arrived in the Dutch Republic filled with enthusiasm; he was very optimistic about 
allying the Dutch and procuring a loan. John settled in Amsterdam to come in closer 
contact with bankers and merchants, and people “who were able and desirous to promote 
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the American cause”.85 After a few weeks John wrote to his wife Abigail that he was 
pleased with the Dutch Republic and that the Dutch “deserve the imitation of my 
countrymen”. A few days later John wrote that he doubted “whether there is any nation of 
Europe more estimable than the Dutch” and that the Dutch “ought to be the examples to 
the world”.86 Also, John reported to Congress about the possibilities of procuring a loan, 
stating that “I am since my arrival here been more convinced than ever, that Congress 
might open a considerable loan here”.87 By procuring a Dutch loan “Commerce may be 
extended between the two Republicks and the political Sentiments and System of Holland 
changed” in favor of the American cause.88 In his letters and diary John was ecstatic 
about the possibilities. It seems the books he had read and the stories he had heard prior 
to his visit were accurate descriptions of Dutch greatness.  
However, John would soon discover that the reality was quite different than his 
initial expectations. Disappointment would cause him to adopt virtually the opposite 
opinion, believing the Dutch Republic had lost its greatness and was in decline.
89
 John’s 
opinion changed after a few months when he experienced difficulties procuring a loan 
from the Amsterdam bankers and realized how complex and retarded the Dutch political 
system was. He referred to the “general Littleness arising from the incessant 
Contemplation of Stivers and Doits, which pervades the whole People”.90 When John 
first arrived in the Dutch Republic he was informed that there were plenty of possibilities 
to procure a loan. But he found that “almost all the professions of Friendship to America, 
which have been made, turn out upon Trial to have been nothing more than little 
Adulations to procure a Share in our Trade”.91 Few people in the Dutch Republic were 
willing to provide a loan and risk losing their money if Britain won the war. The Dutch 
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people showed little interest in the American cause and seemed to provide aid only for 
commercial reasons. The news that in November 1780 the American army had suffered 
major military defeats, including the treason of General Benedict Arnold, worsened the 
chances of getting a loan. John was informed that “never has the credit of America stood 
so low as it does at this hour”, and in turn informed Congress to “depend upon no money 
from” the Dutch Republic.92  
John was disappointed to find the Dutch Republic in such a “deplorable and 
melancholy situation”. To him it seemed that “all the brilliant and sublime Passions are 
lost, and succeded by nothing but the Love of Ease and Money”. The Dutch Republic 
was “sunk in Ease, devoted to the Pursuits of Gain”.93 It was not only John Adams who 
noted this decline of the Dutch Republic. James Harris, the English envoy, confirmed this 
view. He stated that “virtue, the main spring of a commonwealth, no longer subsisted 
among the Dutch: the public was poor; the great riches of individuals destroyed the 
equality necessary to a free state; (…) their government, their administration, their 
consequence, their whole Republic, were in the last stage of degradation, debasement and 
decay”.94 Furthermore, the Dutch habitually admired the British, their natural ally. It 
would be hard and take a lot of time to change those old habits. The Dutch government 
was unwilling to abandon its habits and ally themselves with the United States at the cost 
of declaring war to the British.
95
 
 
Pernicious effects of factionalism & the importance of balance 
What made matters worse was that the Dutch Republic was torn by party quarrels. Dutch 
political society was divided between the pro-English supporters of the Stadtholder and 
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the pro-American Patriots, who were unhappy with the current political situation and 
wanted to reform the political system. John noted that the Dutch were “divided among 
themselves in interest and sentiment” and that “the factions that are raised here (…) have 
been conducted with an indecent ardor, thwarting, contradicting, calumniating each 
other”. He was convinced that party divisions had pernicious effects on a country and 
believed that “the character of this people must change, or they are finally undone”. 96 
 Throughout his life John was convinced of the evils that factions and party 
division brought with them. As early as 1765 John condemned “the Rancour of that fiend, 
the Spirit of Party”.97 In a letter discussing the ratified Massachusetts Constitution, which 
he drafted, he states that “there is nothing which I dread so much as a division of the 
republic into two great parties, each arranged under its leader, and concerting measures in 
opposition to each other. This, in my humble apprehension, is to be dreaded as the 
greatest political evil under our [Massachusetts] Constitution.”98 John believed that the 
creation of factions and parties should be limited and controlled. A constitutional balance 
would serve this purpose and is the key to establishing an enduring free government. 
According to John ancient republics deteriorated over time – as seemed to be happening 
to the Dutch Republic – because improperly mixed government could not control human 
nature and the vices and passions of its subjects, which eventually lead to factionalism.
99
  
John believed that ambition, which he refers to as “the passion for distinction”, 
was the central feature of man’s psychology when acting in the political realm. Though 
this passion tends to promote and nurture genius, in politics it leads to corruption and 
abuse of power. The key task of a constitution was to allow ambition to serve the public 
interest by creating opportunities to both satisfy and press this ambition into the service 
of the public good. A balanced constitution would allow men to distinguish themselves, 
but would also obstruct self-serving schemes and the formation of factions. Compromise 
would be a prerequisite to political achievement, and compromise would be 
accomplished only through appeal to the public good. Without a balanced constitution 
there would be no way of controlling factions short of despotism. In particular, John saw 
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the cleavage between rich and poor as a primary source of faction which a constitution 
must control. In John’s view, the poor are too readily attracted to material gain and 
lawlessness, while the rich too often are attracted to power and corruption. Both groups, 
he believed, are apt to plunder each other. John opposed the French philosophes’ ideas of 
a unified government intended to express the “general will” of the people. Instead, John 
was convinced that an ideally balanced constitution should establish an autonomous 
executive power, a bicameral legislature, and an independent judiciary. These three 
elements would create the ideal mixed constitution and government.
100
 
John wished to export these principles – keeping in mind the cultural and social 
differences – to European countries such as the Dutch Republic, correcting the faults in 
their constitutions and governments. He believed European intellectuals had neglected 
the study of government and the science of society, which had fallen behind other arts 
and sciences. Only a perfectly mixed government and balanced constitution could control 
factionalism and save the Dutch Republic.
101
 The first step towards exporting American 
ideals was convincing European people of the importance of the American cause. John 
set out to convince the Dutch to support the American cause. He received help from 
Dutch Patriots, who, like John, tried to convince the Dutch government to acknowledge 
American independence. Joan Derk van der Capellen, a Dutch nobleman, was the first 
and most prominent figure in the country to champion the American cause. He defended 
the American cause on multiple occasions and even petitioned to gather a loan for the 
United States, investing a great sum of his own fortune. The lawyer, scholar, and editor 
Johan Luzac was another man who came to John’s aid, frequently publishing John’s 
material in his Gazette de Leyden.
102
 
Ironically, their efforts to convince the Dutch government to recognize American 
independence were intensifying the divisions in the Dutch Republic. As opposed to the 
Patriots, the Stadtholder and his followers naturally wanted to obstruct recognition of an 
unlawful rebellion. The historian Adriaan Kluit, one of the Stadtholderate’s proponents, 
described “the evil of American freedom” as “the origin and beginning of all subsequent 
disasters, calamities and losses suffered by the Republic”. It was “an exaggerated 
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people’s government”. Similarly, politician Laurens Pieter van de Spiegel declared that 
“the resulting Union of North America which was a pure democracy turned many a head 
as if there were no freedom outside that Constitution”.103  Debates over recognizing 
American independence increased tensions and divisions in the Dutch Republic.  
 
The war with Britain and increasing sympathies for the American cause 
A threat of war with Britain, at the end of 1780, would further increase the tensions and 
divisions in the country. At the end of the 18
th
 century the Anglo-Dutch relations were 
deteriorating. Since the commencement of war between Britain and the American 
Colonies Dutch merchants were secretly trading with the colonists, even though they had 
signed a treaty with Britain. The British government was well aware of the illegal trade 
and regularly complained. In January 1776 British admiral James Young complained that 
the “very pernicious traffic” between the Dutch and American colonists was “so general 
and done in so public a manner as to be no secret to any person in the West Indies 
islands”. Young was quite right that the trade was not a well kept secret; on 16 November 
1776 a ship flying the colors of the American Congress was saluted when it arrived at the 
Dutch colony of St. Eustatius. In the spring of 1780 Britain started to retaliate and seized 
Dutch ships carrying contraband intended for the American Colonies. In the first month 
about 200 Dutch ships were captured. Out of fear the Dutch Republic sought protection 
from the League of Armed Neutrality, a league of Northern European maritime nations 
who endorse the right of neutral countries to trade by sea without hindrance. But before 
the Dutch Republic could join the League Britain had found a pretext to declare war. A 
British vessel had captured Henry Laurens in September 1780, who was carrying a treaty 
concluded in secret between the American William Lee and the burgomaster of 
Amsterdam. Though the treaty was illegitimate, as the Amsterdam burgomaster did not 
represent the Dutch government, for Britain it was enough to provoke a conflict. The 
British delegate to the Dutch Republic, Sir Joseph Yorke, presented the States-General 
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and Stadtholder with an ultimatum with ridiculous demands, which would undoubtedly, 
and intentionally, lead to war.
104
  
The Dutch Republic became engulfed in a “violent Crisis” and the Dutch people 
were living in constant fear of war. For the Dutch the prospect of war was such a terrible 
thing and “the greatest of Evils” that every man is “afraid to do the least thing that 
England can complain of and make a noise about”. As long as this crisis continued, John 
noted, the Dutch Republic would not recognize American independence nor provide a 
loan to Congress. He states that the continuous threat of war “keeps up the Panick and 
while this Panick continues, I shall certainly have no Success at all. No Man dares engage 
for me, very few dare see me.”105 When the war finally broke out in December 1780, the 
fear of starting a war was replaced by the fear of continuing the war. Merchants and 
bankers were cautious of providing a loan to the United States because they feared being 
pointed out to mobs and soldiers as people who contributed to the continuance of the war 
with Britain. John was being “avoided like a pestilence by every man in government”.106  
John was hopeful the situation would change, and rightfully so. The Dutch people 
were starting to show increasing sympathy for the American cause. In addition to the 
economic interest there was a political and spiritual sympathy – even a feeling of affinity 
– with the American cause by the end of 1780.107 For instance, James Harris declared that 
“the example of fortunate resistance in the British colonies in America had an influence 
on the tempers and sentiments of men all over Europe, but particularly in the United 
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Provinces”. 108  Similarly, Van der Capellen and the more moderate Patriot Herman 
Hendrik Vitringa declared that “the North American spirit of freedom” had spread 
throughout the Dutch Republic.
109
 Joseph Mandrillon, a French author and bookseller, 
even argues that pamphlets on the American cause would instigate the revolutionary 
Patriot movement in the following years: “if one wishes to know the origin of the first 
fermentation amongst the inhabitants, I think one should ascribe it to the excellent works 
published in England on the subject of the American was and primarily to those by 
Doctor Price, which have been translated into Dutch and read with extraordinary 
eagerness by all ranks and classes of Burghers”.110 
John was one of the pamphlet writers who fervently propagated the American 
cause and opposed any form of Anglo-Dutch relations. In John’s eyes Britain was 
treating the Dutch Republic as one of their colonies, thinking of “nothing but devouring 
Holland”. Under such tyranny the Dutch Republic showed “every Symptom of an Agony, 
that usually preceeds a great Revolution”, and it eventually drove a wedge between 
Britain and the Dutch Republic.
111
 He believed that signing a treaty of amity and 
commerce with the United States – the “only remaining barrier against despotism” – 
would save the Dutch Republic from such a situation of tyranny and fear. France was 
saved from ruin and experienced an increase in reputation, wealth, and power by allying 
themselves and trading with the Americans, showing that the United States is a “country 
whose friendship and alliance is worth cultivating”.112  
 John’s Memorial to the States-General, presented on 19 April 1781, is a perfect 
example of his propaganda for the American cause. He presented his arguments in the 
hopes of convincing them to recognize American independence and open trade relations. 
One of the major themes in his Memorial is the comparison between the American cause 
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and the Dutch Revolt against the Spanish. Such a comparison was in vogue in the 
American colonies at an early stage; Pauline Maier cites an example from as early as 
1772. Maier cites a newspaper article which declared that the American colonies “soon 
put in practice their mediated plan, of the United Provinces, after the example of the 
Dutch, and form an independent commonwealth”. 113  For the American colonists the 
Dutch example showed that a revolt against a strong king could succeed, and that they 
could survive independently as a loosely confederated republic.
114
 The comparison was 
also frequently hauled on the other side of the Atlantic, most notably in Antoine Marie 
Cerisier’s Le Politique Hollandais (1781-2) which compared King George III with Philip 
II of Spain and George Washington with William of Orange.
115
 In his Memorial John 
makes similar comparisons. He notes the similarities between the American and Dutch 
republics, stating that they “are so much alike, that the History of one seems but a 
Transcript from that of the other” and that “a natural Alliance may be formed between the 
two Republicks, if ever one existed among Nations”. Another major theme in the 
Memorial is the economic benefits the Dutch Republic could gain from trading with the 
American colonies. John argues that a “Connection with the United States would be 
useful to this Republick” because the Dutch Republic can then “shake off the Shackle” of 
English political and economic pressure and benefit from American trade and 
commerce.
116
 Furthermore, the United States would not form competition for the Dutch 
merchants since American trade will be “retarded” by independence and it will then be 
long “before the Trade of America will interfere with that of any Nation”.117 According 
to John there is then no reason to try to remain friends with Britain, and every reason to 
sign a treaty with the United States. 
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Dutch recognition of American independence  
As John had hoped the situation in the Dutch Republic was changing. How big a role 
John played is difficult to determine, but what is clear is that by early 1782 propaganda 
and excitement had created an atmosphere wherein recognition could be brought about. 
The American cause was becoming more popular and serious indications were given of a 
disposition to acknowledge American independence. A series of petitions were published 
in the early spring of 1782 to convince the States-General to recognize American 
independence. These petitions did not contain businesslike prognoses based on costs and 
benefits. Instead, they contained notions of brotherhood and improbable illusions about 
an unlimited prosperity in commerce. John was also becoming more popular, as he had 
“lately grown much into fashion”.118 The States-General eventually recognized American 
independence and recognized John as the American representative to the Dutch Republic 
on 19 April 1782, exactly a year after John had presented his memorial.
119
 
To John the recognition of American independence by the Dutch Republic 
was one of the most important events in American history. The American cause had 
triumphed over a long habit of friendship between the British and the Dutch, over 
commercial interests and over the intrigues of courts and ruling families.
120
 JA 
writes that “the Standard of the United-States waves and flies, at the Hague, in 
triumph over Sir Joseph York's Insolence and British Pride. When I go to Heaven, I 
shall look down, over the Battlements, with pleasure, upon the Stripes and Stars, 
wantoning in the Wind, at the Hague.”121  
In his letters and diary JA left no doubt as to who brought about the recognition of 
the United States. It was JA himself who had “planted the American Standard at The 
Hague”. It was “that well-hove Harpoon-Iron the memorial of the 19th of April 1781 – 
and other innumerable measures taken in consequence of it, by the same hand” that 
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prevented the Dutch Republic from making peace with Britain and stimulated the Dutch 
to recognize the American independence.
122
  
It is important to note that John sometimes downplayed his role in the recognition 
of American independence. For instance, in a letter to the Secretary of State he states that 
his Memorial had led to military victories and patriotic zeal among the Dutch, but in the 
same letter he downplays it by saying: “What a Dust We raise, said the Fly upon the 
Chariot Wheel? It is impossible to prove that this whole Letter is not a similar delusion to 
that of the Fly.” 123  Also, this letter was sent on February 21, prior to the official 
recognition of American independence. At this time he was still cautious about 
celebrating “his” victory. After the official recognition in April John was overjoyed and 
left little doubt in his statements that he alone should be praised for the recognition, 
especially in private correspondence. It is true that in September 1782 he states that the 
American “cause could not have succeeded here without the aid of France”.124 But again 
this was a letter to the Secretary of State. His tone in private correspondence is quite 
different, in which he is often more unrestrained in his expressions and beliefs. Such 
statements, I believe, are then peculiarities and are not representative for John’s general 
disposition. 
Schulte Nordholt seems to agree with John’s own interpretation, stating that “it 
was due to his spirit of enterprise and self-assurance that the recognition of his country 
was in fact effectuated”. He became convinced that John was the prime-mover behind the 
recognition of American independence by the Dutch Republic.
125
 But such a conclusion 
seems to be one-sided. It is hard to believe that John alone brought about the recognition 
of American independence while other factors were also at play, such as other foreign 
ministers and the Dutch people themselves.  
James Hutson represents an opposing – and more convincing – view to Schulte 
Northolt’s statement, arguing that John’s own accounts are not accurate descriptions of 
reality. He states that John was ignorant about what was happening in early 1782, his 
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illness – lasting from August 1781 to June of the following year – being partly to 
blame.
126
 Furthermore, he had avoided contact with Vauguyon, the French diplomat to 
the Dutch Republic, and knew little about his activities. John, therefore, could judge 
Vauguyon’s actions only by what he saw of him in public. However, in 1781-82 
Vauguyon was directed by Vergennes to pursue a policy of circumspection, especially in 
his efforts to produce a Dutch acknowledgement of American independence. Vauguyon’s 
efforts thus remained out of the public eye. France initially opposed recognition, but after 
the British defeat at Yorktown Vergennes feared Britain would make a quick, separate 
peace with the Dutch Republic. Successful peace negotiations would restore the pro-
British Stadtholder’s credibility and his position of power, simultaneously undermining 
the position of the pro-French Patriots. To avoid losing Dutch allies it became imperative 
for Vergennes to obstruct the peace negotiations, and Dutch recognition of American 
independence would be a step towards that goal. It would create “an invincible obstacle 
to the actual reconciliation of England and Holland”. Hutson thus argues that French 
diplomatic policy and Vauguyon’s efforts made the recognition of American 
independence possible.
127
 Due to Vauguyon’s policy of circumspection John had no idea 
of his plans and still believed France was opposing Dutch recognition of American 
independence. John wrote to his friends that “the finesse and subtilty of the 2 ministers 
were exhausted to defeat me”, and that they were “certainly mortified at the prospects of 
my success”. Believing in French malevolence made it easier for John to exaggerate that 
Dutch recognition was brought about entirely due to his efforts.
128
  
But what these two authors seem to overlook or underestimate is the influence of 
the Dutch people themselves on the recognition of American independence. For instance, 
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it seems that especially the Dutch merchants played an important part in the recognition. 
They initially blocked John’s attempts of getting a loan. Only after an American victory 
was becoming more plausible and Britain had declared war on the Dutch Republic, were 
the Dutch merchants and bankers willing to negotiate a loan. They started to realize the 
commercial possibilities independent American colonies had to offer without the 
interference of the British. The same merchants published a series of petitions in 1782 
seeking the recognition of American independence. It is then impossible to ignore the 
role of the Dutch merchants, and attribute the recognition of American independence 
solely to John’s efforts.129   
John writes of the tremendous effect the Dutch recognition of American 
independence had in Europe. Support for the American cause had become widespread 
among the European countries. The ministers of the European powers have become 
“complaisant and Sociable” towards the Americans in the Dutch Republic. But more 
importantly, as John repeatedly states, most European powers had come to consider the 
independence of America as “decided”.130 
 
 
1.4 – First lessons 
 
John Adams was sent abroad at a time when the United States was waging a war for 
independence against Britain and was desperate for any international aid and recognition. 
He was initially sent to France to broker an alliance and maintain friendly relations. 
During his missions in France John became convinced that the French government 
wanted to influence American policy. In order to make the United States less dependent 
upon French aid, and simultaneously strengthen its international position, John travelled 
to the Dutch Republic. There he intended to procure a loan and convince the States-
General to recognize American independence. But John believed he was still being 
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closely watched by spies and his attempts to become less dependent of France were 
constantly being sabotaged. John had ended all communications with the French 
government, but nevertheless remained watchful of its actions and intentions. It appeared 
that the French government was not as well-disposed with the United States as most 
Americans believed.  
Despite French counteraction, John still had hope in the Dutch people for support. 
But John’s initial hope and belief in the greatness of Dutch republicanism was quickly 
shattered as he learned that the republic had “sunk in ease”. The Dutch people were more 
concerned with commerce than their own liberties and those of the American colonists. 
They had lost the spirit of patriotism that separated them from other Europeans. Again 
they were subjugated by a monarch, this time in the form of the Stadtholder supported by 
the British crown. Over the years the Dutch people had become entangled in a tradition of 
fearing and revering Britain. It seems that the Dutch people were no better than the rest of 
the corrupt and decadent people of Europe and that only Americans were destined to 
create a lasting republic.  
 What made matters worse was that the Dutch people were politically divided 
between supporters of the Stadtholderate and the so-called Patriots who strove for 
political reforms. John attributed the internal strive to the flawed political system of the 
Dutch Republic, which made it possible for tyranny to succeed and for political divisions 
to flourish. An ideally balance constitution and government, John believed, would have 
prevented such internal strife. He was convinced that a similar disaster could still be 
avoided in the United States by creating a balanced government. John sincerely believed 
in the pernicious effects of factionalism and he experienced first-hand how the struggle 
between the supporters of the Stadtholder and the Patriots was tearing up the country. 
John had frequently written home, warning Americans and Congress about the dangers of 
political divisions. He had already caught a glimpse of the possible dangers of divisions 
among Americans during his missions to France. The quarrels between Americans abroad 
– including between Adams and Franklin – were damaging the credibility and 
international reputation of the United States. John started to fear that disunity among 
Americans would expose the weaknesses of the American nation, and make it easier for 
foreign powers to interfere. It was perfectly clear to him that internal strife could bring 
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ruin to the United States as it did to the Dutch Republic. It became increasingly important 
for the United States to avoid factionalism and John believed a balanced constitution was 
the ideal solution. Indeed, the fear of factionalism would be one of the main driving 
forces behind the establishment of a new constitution in 1787. 
Yet, the recognition of American independence, the breaking with tradition, and 
signs of a new political movement willing to reform the country gave John hope that the 
Dutch Republic could again achieve greatness. But that hope would soon fade when 
Prussian forces invaded the Dutch Republic in 1787. It seemed because the Dutch 
Republic had sunk in ease and was afflicted by factionalism that the way was paved for 
intervention by foreign powers.  
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Chapter 2: In between diplomats, 1782-1794 
 
2.1 – The Dutch Patriot movement 
 
Though John Adams would only be officially recalled in 1788, by the end of 1782 his 
mission was complete and he had already left the Dutch Republic. By that time emerging 
political discontent had culminated in the Dutch Patriot movement, which was dedicated 
to transferring power from the Stadtholder and the regents to the people. The debate over 
state reforms originated in the 1750s. Stadtholder William IV and his successor William 
V controlled most of the Dutch government. Because they were entitled to appoint 
commanders of the army and navy they could build a clientele system. In exchange for an 
appointment the officers remained loyal to the Stadtholders. What made matters worse 
was the on-going period of economic decline during the reign of both Stadtholders, 
mainly due to British maritime superiority and decades of international and internal 
conflict. In the 1750s this gave rise to a series of debates between supporters of the 
Stadtholder and their opponents concerning the decline of the Dutch Republic and the 
political reforms necessary to halt it.  At this time the debates caused political tension, but 
nothing more.  
In the 1770s, with the model of the American Revolution, Dutch intellectuals 
began to formulate radical new ideas on freedom and sovereignty of the people inspired 
by Enlightenment thinkers. The emerging idea that the Stadtholder and regents had too 
much sovereignty and the common people too little was gaining ground. Economic and 
political events were making matters worse. The outbreak of the war with Britain in late 
1780 proved disastrous for the Dutch commerce, and the defeat was blamed on the 
Stadtholder. This was a perfect footing for the Patriot movement to emerge.
131
 
In 1781 Joan Derk van der Capellen anonymously published a pamphlet entitled 
Aan het Volk van Nederlaned (translated: To the People of the Netherlands), which 
became the manifesto of the Patriot Revolution. Van der Capellen argued that the country 
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belongs to the people and all source of authority derives from them. The political leaders 
merely represent the people. He also argued that too much power inevitably led to 
corruption and thus the people must always be distrustful and watchful of their leaders. 
The people must remain vigilant and prevent abuse of sovereignty.
132
 It is important to 
note that Van der Capellen did not intend to instigate a political revolution; he merely 
opposed abuse of sovereignty, not the Stadtholderate itself. Nevertheless his pamphlet 
marked the commencement of revolutionary events.
133
 
 The patriots took Van der Capellen’s ideas a step further and wanted to strip the 
Stadtholder of most of his power. The Stadtholder would no longer have the ability to 
appoint military officers and the executive and legislative power, both in the hands of the 
Stadtholder, would be separated. The legislative power of the States-General would 
exceed the executive power of the Stadtholder. The Stadtholder was to become a servant 
of the Dutch people once again.
134
 The Stadtholderian party, on the other hand, wanted to 
preserve the status quo, arguing that the power of the Stadtholder was lawfully attained 
over the years.
135
 The conflict escalated to the point that in 1786 Patriot civilian militias 
removed city governments in Utrecht and other major cities and took over control. At that 
time John Adams had decided to travel through the Dutch Republic with his wife Abigail 
and arrived in Utrecht in 1786. There he witnessed the inauguration of new magistrates 
who had been democratically elected according to a new municipal constitution. He later 
wrote to Thomas Jefferson: “We were present at Utrecht at the August Ceremony of 
Swearing in their new Magistrates. In no instance of ancient or modern History, have the 
People ever asserted more unequivocally their own inherent and unalienable 
sovereignty.”136 In the summer of 1787 the conflict between Patriots and the supporters 
of the Stadtholder had reached such intensity that the country was on the verge of civil 
war. Only with the aid of the Prussian king Frederick William II, the Stadtholder’s 
brother-in-law, could the Patriot movement be halted.
137
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American responses 
The internal strife in the Netherlands reached its peak at almost exactly the time when the 
Constitutional Convention was meeting in Philadelphia. In the debates of the Convention 
and the ratification debates the Dutch Republic was mentioned more often than any other 
state except Britain. In the eighteenth century people generally assumed that human 
behavior – in the past, present, and future – held to certain patterns, and that they could 
learn from historical events. Most American statesmen believed that the events of the 
Dutch Republic reflected what could happen in the United States. Especially the 
shortcomings of the Dutch state, which could explain the political chaos under the rule of 
the Stadtholder, were of interest to the Americans. American statesmen generally 
believed that the troubles of the Dutch Republic could become the troubles of the 
American republic. It is then no wonder that the events were anxiously observed in the 
United States. By studying the Dutch example the American founders hoped that the new 
American constitution could avoid the mistakes of the Dutch system.
138
 
 When the Prussian army invaded the Dutch Republic and restored the power of 
the Stadtholder, Americans voiced their dismay. To Thomas Jefferson, at the time the 
minister to France, the actions of the Stadtholder and Prussian king confirmed the 
tyrannical tendencies of monarchs. He concluded that European government are 
“government of kites over pidgeons”. Jefferson believed that there was a huge difference 
between the New and the Old World. Comparing American and European governments 
would be “like a comparison of heaven and hell”. 139  John Adams came to similar 
conclusions, believing that if Americans would succeed in their revolution, in contrast to 
the Dutch, it was because they were somehow better people than Europeans. This did not 
mean John Adams was unsympathetic to the Patriots’ cause; to Jefferson he confessed 
that “I tremble and agonize for the suffering of Patriots in Holland”.  The invasion was “a 
most outrageous insult in the face of the whole World” and “the Friends of Liberty must 
be very unhappy”. But behind the empathy was a feeling of superiority caused by 
considering the Dutch as a European people. In the end the banishment of liberty and 
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freedom and the restoration of tyranny in the Dutch Republic were the fault of the Dutch 
people themselves; unlike the Americans, they were not suited for republicanism. In the 
Dutch Republic “no rational plan of a reformation of their Government has been 
concerted by the People or their Leader. It is a repetition of the Catastrophy of all ill 
constituted Republicks, and is a living Warning to our United States.” His final verdict, in 
the spring of 1788, was harsh: “The Patriots in this country were little read in History, 
less in Government: knew little of the human heart and still less of the World. They have 
therefore been the Dupes of Foreign Politicks, and their own undigested systems.”140  
 These words of Adams and Jefferson indicate that in these early years of 
American nationhood Americans showed a sense of separation from, and superiority to, 
European affairs that provided the underpinnings for the policy of neutrality and non-
entanglement. They concluded from the Dutch example that civil strife invites foreign 
intervention; something they desperately sought to avoid.
141
 The United States had 
learned an “important lesson, that no circumstances of morality, honour, interest, or 
engagement are sufficient to authorize a secure reliance on any nation, at all times, and in 
all positions. A moment of difficulty, or a moment of error may render for ever useless 
the most friendly dispositions in the king, in the major part of his ministers, and in the 
whole of his nation.”142 The conflict in the Dutch Republic had clearly revealed to the 
United States the dangers of factionalism and foreign influences.  
 
 
2.2 – The creation of the American Constitution, 1787-89 
 
By the 1780s the American press and personal correspondence  were filled with warnings 
of ruin. By 1786 the many defects of the Articles of Confederation – such as the inability 
of Congress to raise taxes and regulate the nation’s commerce – had become painfully 
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clear. Political leaders in all the states, even the later opponents of the Constitution, 
wanted to strengthen or amend the Articles of Confederation and make the United States 
a respectable nation. Yet the defects cannot account for the creation of an extraordinarily 
powerful and distant national government, which was virtually inconceivable a decade 
earlier.  
It was the excesses of democracy, the unanticipated consequences of the 
Revolution, that Americans feared were threatening the very essence of their experiment. 
The Revolution had greatly democratized the state legislatures by increasing the number 
of members and by broadening the electorates. Many ordinary men of more humble 
origins than the men that sat in the colonial assemblies were being elected as 
representatives. A greater number of representatives was replaced with new faces from 
year to year, disturbing the political stability.  
The nature of the legislatures also changed. Whereas the colonial assemblies spent 
much of their time dealing with petty local grievances, the new legislatures dealt with 
economic and commercial affairs on a grander scale. Moreover, constituents were 
pressuring their representatives to legislate on behalf of their own interests – 
disinterestedness seemed absent. The increased and constantly shifting power created 
turbulent circumstances which alarmed the revolutionary leaders.
143
 
No government could be just if parties and people promoting their private 
interests became judges in their own causes; interested majorities in legislatures were no 
better in this respect than interested minorities. The solution to this problem was sought 
in the creation of a national government that would be an impartial judge over all the 
competing interests in society. According to James Madison, dubbed the father of the 
Constitution, the new Constitution would create a “disinterested & dispassionate umpire 
in disputes between different passions & interests” in the various states. In fact, he hoped 
the new government might play the same super-political neutral role the British kin 
ideally had been supposed to play in the empire. Madison, and other Federalists, hoped 
that an expanded national sphere of operation would prevent the diverse and clashing 
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interests of the society from combining to create tyrannical majorities in the new national 
government.
144
 
 
 
2.3 – The emergence of the Jeffersonian Republican Party 
 
Although Americans were universally hostile to the idea of parties, in 1792 observers for 
the first time began to speak of parties in Congress. The opposition impulse by, among 
others, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison was primarily a reaction to the increasing 
influence of the treasury department over government decisions and to Alexander 
Hamilton’s grand economic design. Hamilton’s fiscal programs were based on the British 
model of a strong central bank and government encouragement of wealthy investors who 
would promote commerce and manufactures. Hamilton and his Federalist supporters 
believed that only the federal government could inspire confidence among people of 
wealth and thereby create the strong national economy needed to secure a republican 
form of government over an extended geographical area. All hostilities accumulated in 
the recent years would burst into partisan warfare. 
 
The dangers of factionalism 
Americans in general considered the forming of parties or factions as disruptive and 
subversive. Americans believed that society should be as much as possible an organic 
whole, characterized by harmony and like-mindedness. Parties and factions created 
unnatural conflicts and the disruptions they caused in the political order could lead to 
instability, anarchy, and tyranny.
145
 
In defense of the federal constitution James Madison published one of his most 
famous essays, Federalist number 10, in which he argued that the new constitution would 
check the rise of factions. Madison describes factions as “a number of citizens, whether 
amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some 
common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the 
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permanent and aggregate interests of the community”. Among the advantages of “a well 
constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to 
break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular governments never finds 
himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their 
propensity to this dangerous vice.”146 
Similarly, in his Farewell Address of 1796 George Washington emphasized the 
importance of maintaining an American union, arguing that the rise of political parties is 
detrimental to the health of the republic. Washington warned the American people 
“against the baneful effects of the spirit of party generally. (…) It agitates the community 
with ill-founded jealousies and false alarms; kindles the animosity of one part against 
another; foments occasionally riot and insurrection.” Factions are used by “cunning, 
ambitious and unprincipled men (…) to subvert the Power of the People and to usurp for 
themselves the reins of Government”.147 
These ideas had become widespread among all Americans, including members of 
the future Republican Party. Consequently, any American political leader of the 1790s 
engaged in factional politics was suspect and had to persuade others that his views did 
not endanger the American nation.
148
 Why then did an opposition party emerge within 
such an environment? 
 
Necessary faction 
Republicans believed their party was necessary. Thomas Jefferson, by the middle of the 
1790s the de facto leader of the Republican Party, begrudgingly acknowledged the 
necessity of opposing political factions. He stated that “in every free and deliberating 
society, there must, from the nature of man, be opposite parties, and violent dissensions 
and discords. (…) Perhaps this party division is necessary to induce each to watch and 
relate to the people the proceedings of the other.”149 Republicans would then “watch” the 
Federalists. They feared Federalists would concentrate too much power in the national 
government and would create a small elite of merchants and financiers. 
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While the Federalists continued to see themselves as the legitimate administration 
that represented the whole people and the general well-being of the nation, the 
Republicans started to describe themselves as a separate faction and did so out of 
necessity. The Republicans of the 1790s coalesced around the broad issues of limiting 
federal power and expanding popular participation in politics. According to Madison the 
Republican Party represented the opposition of the people against the Federalist “court”. 
Republicans believed “that mankind are capable of governing themselves” and hated 
“hereditary power as an insult to reason and an outrage to the rights of man”.150  
The Republican ideology, involving a deep hatred of overgrown central power 
and a fear of the political and financial mechanisms that sustained such power, had been 
inherited from the English radical Whig opposition tradition that had been sharpened and 
Americanized during the Revolution. In the 1790s this ideology was given heightened 
relevance by the – according to Republicans – monarchical politics of the Federalist 
administration. Republicans believed that the Federalists’ system would re-create the 
kind of government that was overthrown in 1776. In Republicans’ eyes Hamilton’s 
program – including assuming the state debts from the Revolutionary war, establishing a 
standing army, and creating a national bank – appeared to be reminiscent of the 
corruption and enhancement of executive power at the expense of the people that 
Walpole and other ministers had done in Britain earlier in the century. Republicans 
believed that monarchism was once again threatening liberty, and their party was justified 
as a means of arousing the people into resistance.
151
 
 Jefferson warned President Washington that the treasury department “possessed 
already such an influence as to swallow up the whole Executive powers, and (…) even 
the future Presidents would not be able to make head against this department”. He 
believed that the “ultimate object” of Hamilton’s system was “to prepare the way for a 
change from the present republican form of government, to that of a monarchy, of which 
the English constitution is to be the model”. If the great mass of the people did not rise up 
and support the Republican Party the American union itself might break apart. The fear 
that the “Monarchical Federalists” were using the new government “simply as a stepping 
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stone to monarchy” and “subverting step by step the principles of the Constitution” 
became the basis of Jefferson’s thinking in the 1790s and the central theme of the 
emerging Republican Party. Hamilton’s denial that there was a conspiracy to transform 
the United States into a monarchy had little effect. By the end of 1792 Jefferson and his 
fellow Republicans had become convinced that Hamilton and other Federalists were deep 
in corruption.
 152
 
While the confrontations of the 1790s certainly provided the atmosphere for the 
parties to form, the ideological frameworks around which the Federalist-Republican party 
system was formed existed prior to that period. The political battles of the period were 
manifestations of basic differences already present during the Constitutional Convention 
in 1787. 
 
 
2.4 – The French Revolution in the United States 
 
Most Europeans held to a widely accredited theory, which coalesced in the 1760s and 
persisted for years thereafter, that the climate of the New World was so unfavorable that 
forms of animals and human life would inevitably degenerate. The American wilderness 
corrupted its inhabitants. This belief that the New World was incapable of progress was 
also widespread among French philosophes, but the outbreak of the American Revolution 
changed their minds. A ruling dogma of the French enlightenment was the idea of 
progress: a faith in people’s capacity to improve their political, economic, and intellectual 
conditions through reason. The American Revolution showed that Americans were 
virtuous and enlightened and that there was hope for them yet. The American struggle for 
liberty could even serve as a useful example to rejuvenate France’s deteriorating political 
and economic condition. 
But this belief in American progress only partially eclipsed the degeneration 
theory, and soon disappeared again. Once the French Revolution had taken on a life of its 
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own, the example of the American Revolution was no longer needed. French intellectuals 
returned to the idea that the American environment created a set of influences which 
threaten to pervade and corrupt the entire civilized world. The French Revolutionary 
ideals seemed to be the answer to such corruption, in the New and the Old World.
153
  
 
Outbreak of the French Revolution 
By the time the French Revolution broke out Americans were building a new world. 
French revolutionaries were well under way of emulating their own revolution, which 
validated and nourished Americans’ opinion of their own cause. The newly formed 
United States was still very fragile and welcomed every sanction of legitimacy it could 
get its hands on. Initially, American enthusiasm for the French Revolution was almost 
unanimous. The French Revolution and its ideals of freedom and democracy awakened 
sympathy among Americans and they felt a sense of kinship with French revolutionaries. 
Americans were thrilled to learn that in September 1792 the French armies had defeated 
Austrian and Prussian counter-revolutionary forces and France was declared a republic. 
France had become a sister republic, joining the United States in a common struggle 
against the forces of monarchism. In the United States elaborate celebrations were held 
throughout the nation in the winter of 1792-93.  
However, in April 1793 Americans received more news from the other side of the 
Atlantic that would not be welcomed so joyously by everyone. King Louis XVI was 
publicly executed, France had declared war on England and the Netherlands – forcing all 
of Europe to arms –, and Frenchmen were rioting and being massacred. By June 1793 the 
Gironde government had fallen and Jacobin rule began under the leadership of 
Robespierre. The ensuing Reign of Terror shocked most Americans and dampened their 
earlier enthusiasm. These events would compel Americans to choose sides between the 
pro-English Federalists and the pro-French Republicans.
154
  
The winter celebrations of 1792-93 were so exuberant that many Federalists 
became alarmed. Since the 1780s Federalists had become cautious about the growth of 
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popular power unleashed by the American Revolution. They believed that representative 
governments were easily undermined by an excess of democracy, and that stability of the 
new national government depended on the establishment of a certain distance from the 
direct voice of the people. The Constitution and the federal government were created in 
part to control such democratic tendencies. Government was safest in the hands of 
independent individuals, which usually meant people of wealth and social standing. The 
events in France further intensified Federalist fears: Federalists were horrified by the 
regicide and violence. Federalists became convinced that the radical egalitarian principles 
of the French Revolution were paving the way for popular anarchy in the United States 
and would eventually corrupt American society.
155
 Hamilton declared that there was no 
“real resemblance” between the two revolutions and that their “difference is no less great 
than that between Liberty and Licentiousness”.156 Federalists favored an alliance with 
Britain as that nation that was most likely to promote commerce and investment in the 
United States. Also, the government of Britain stood as a strong model of constitutional 
order, as opposed to what they saw as the radicalism of the French Revolution.
157
 
Republicans, on the other hand, considered the fate of the two revolutions as 
intertwined. They applauded the abolition of monarchy and the violence was considered a 
necessary evil for a much greater cause. Like French revolutionaries, Republicans meant 
to subvert the existing structure of authority and bring down the aristocrats in their own 
country. Even as many Americans became disenchanted with the course of the French 
Revolution and French restrictions on American commerce, the Republicans adamantly 
opposed abandoning their French ally and seeking closer ties with Britain. Republicans 
opposed any sort of alliance with the British, who they believed would always attempt to 
keep the United States in a kind of colonial dependence. Britain’s monarchy and 
hierarchical society were fundamentally at odds with the republican principles of the 
America government. Furthermore, they feared that Britain’s mercantile and commercial 
strength would restrict the economic growth of the United States. The distinctions 
between the Federalist and Republican Party over the French Revolution grew to such 
proportions that for at least the remainder of the decade it became impossible for 
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Americans to think of the French Revolution separate from their own cause: either as 
polar opposites or as twin revolutions.
158
 
 
Proclamation of Neutrality 
Despite the differences between the Federalists and the Republican Party concerning the 
French Revolution, both parties remained convinced that the United States should not 
involve itself in European affairs and had to remain neutral in the European wars. In 1793 
the French government requested the United States to join in their war against Britain, 
which would have surely damaged American commerce. Joining the war would endanger 
the national structure and independence of the new, still fragile, American nation. On 
recommendation of both Hamilton and Jefferson President Washington issued a 
Proclamation of Neutrality on 22 April 1793, declaring the United States would remain 
neutral in the conflict between France and Britain.
159
  
Yet, a mutual interest in neutrality did not solve the party divisions. Both parties 
supported the Proclamation for their own reasons and hoped to use it to their advantage. 
In an effort to repel waves of criticism on the President and win support for the 
proclamation, Hamilton wrote several newspaper essays under the name “Pacificus” in 
the summer of 1793. Hamilton defended the right of the United States to remain neutral 
and independent and defended the President’s authority as the executive to declare 
neutrality. Jefferson became alarmed that neutrality would benefit the Federalists and 
improve relations with Britain, and urged Madison to respond to Hamilton’s writings. As 
“Helvidius” Madison focused on the constitutional limits of the executive, comparing the 
executive power to that of royal prerogatives of the British government. Despite agreeing 
on neutrality, party division reared its ugly head. Both parties still begrudged each other 
any popularity.
160
 
 
 
 
                                                 
158
 Wood, Empire of Liberty, 177-81. 
159
 Bemis, John Quincy Adams, 32-33; Elkins & McKitrick, Age of Federalism, 354-60; Wood, Empire of 
Liberty, 182. 
160
 Wood, Empire of Liberty, 184-85. 
57 
 
Diplomatic crises and deteriorating relations 
Though the Proclamation kept the United States out of the European war, future events 
would still involve the United States in European affairs. The arrival of Citizen Genet and 
the signing of Jay’s Treaty would put friendships to the test, and simultaneously intensify 
party divisions. When the French representative Genet arrived in the United States in 
April 1793 he was greeted with warmth and enthusiasm. He was sent to the New World 
to spread the principles of the French Republic, including to the Spanish and British 
holdings, and to make the United States a neutral base for French military operations. 
Thus Genet was instructed to have the American government recognize their treaty 
obligations of 1778 in the broadest sense of the word by requesting exclusive rights to 
American ports – excluding British ships – and the opportunity to outfit French privateers 
in American ports. Weakening Spanish and British influence and strengthening the 
support for the French cause among the American people would greatly benefit France’s 
international position. But Genet’s requests were in violation of neutrality in international 
law. President Washington received Genet as Minister, thus recognizing the French 
Republic, but refused to accept his requests on the basis that it would endanger American 
neutrality. Genet responded by appealing directly to the American people to join the war, 
avoiding the official lines of communication. Washington was outraged and had no 
choice but to request Genet’s recall. 161  Logically the French government became 
frustrated that the United States, whom it had supported during the war with Britain, was 
not coming to its aid. Furthermore, the Citizen Genet affair increased the tensions 
between the Federalists and Republicans. Federalists came to suspect that the 
Democratic-Republicans clubs organized to celebrate the French Revolution actually 
existed to stir up opposition against the Washington administration. Republicans, in 
response, considered such suspicions as part of the Federalists’ plans to tighten their hold 
on the national government. 
The Genet incident strained American relations with France at a time when 
relations with Britain were far from satisfactory. British troops still occupied forts in the 
Northwest and the British navy was seizing American ships bound for French ports. 
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Federalists favored a pro-British policy because their commercial interests profited from 
trade with Britain. In 1794 they urged the President to settle the matter. Washington thus 
sent John Jay to London as a special envoy, where he negotiated a treaty securing 
withdrawal of British soldiers from western forts and a promise to pay damages for 
Britain’s seizure of ships and cargoes in 1793 and 1794. Reflecting the weakness of the 
American international position, the treaty placed severe limitations on American trade 
with the West Indies and did not mention either the seizure of American ships in the 
future, or so-called impressment – the forcing of American sailors into British naval 
service. Jay also accepted the British view that naval stores and war material were 
contraband which could not be conveyed to enemy ports by neutral ships. Of course the 
Republicans opposed Jay’s Treaty as too favorable to Britain. Support for Republican 
opposition became widespread because many Americans feared the idea of any dealings 
with Britain which might expose a disparity in power between them. A suspicion of a 
disparity in power was after all the reason they declared themselves independent. After 
long debate, however, the Senate ratified the treaty. Needless to say the ratification 
debate increased the tensions between the Federalists and Republicans. Moreover, 
ratification of the treaty angered France. France had hoped the United States would join 
in its war with Britain, but Jay’s Treaty had prevented American involvement. France 
now believed the United States had abandoned its old ally in favor of Britain.
162
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Chapter 3: John Quincy Adams, 1794-1797 
 
 
 
John Quincy Adams, by John Singleton Copley, 1796 
 
 
John Quincy Adams (1767 – 1848) matured during the American Revolution. He grew up 
believing in the ideals of the Revolution and the importance of independence. John 
Quincy spent much of his youth abroad alongside his father, John Adams, while he was 
on his diplomatic missions in Europe, including France and the Netherlands. During these 
years John Quincy grew close to his father and learned to idolize him. To John Quincy 
60 
 
his father was a hero and the most successful diplomat in Europe. While accompanying 
his father he met many diplomats and quickly learned the protocol of diplomacy. John 
Quincy would put this knowledge to good use during his own diplomatic missions, 
including one to the Netherlands.
163
After his diplomatic missions he would author the 
Monroe Doctrine as Secretary of State, modernize American economy as President, and 
oppose slavery as a member of Congress during the last 17 years of his life.  Of his 
impressive public career, John Quincy became best known as a diplomat who shaped 
foreign policy in line with his commitment to American republican values.  
John Adams was succeeded as minister to the Netherlands by William Short, who 
held the position from June to December 1792. Short reluctantly accepted his 
appointment as minister to the Netherlands and would rather have succeeded Thomas 
Jefferson as Minister to France. His residence was too short and his writings about his 
appointment were too limited to be of any importance to this thesis.
164
 Short was 
succeeded by John Quincy Adams, who started his career in public service at the time 
when the French Revolution reached its peak. The French Revolution was to present 
American diplomacy with grave dangers and great opportunities. The dangers flowing 
from European upheaval and the Franco-American alliance consisted of French intrusions 
into American domestic politics, after the manner of French intervention in the neutral 
states of Europe. The international wars and disputes sparked by the Revolution put 
pressure on American neutrality and friendship at the very time when American national 
power was first taking shape.
165
 
 
 
3.1 – Defending neutrality 
 
The arrival of Citizen Genet stirred up party divisions and sparked up a public debate 
over neutrality. John Quincy was one of the writers who did most to marshal opinion 
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behind the President in this first crisis of foreign affairs. He was convinced that the 
French Revolutionary leaders were wrong in seeking to overthrow other governments in a 
war of propaganda and force. It would be a mistake of the American government to 
abandon neutrality and take sides with the Jacobins. Washington’s Proclamation of 
Neutrality was not yet known in Boston when John Quincy wrote a letter to the 
Columbian Centinel, under the pseudonym “Marcellus”, warning his countrymen against 
privateering under a belligerent flag. If they did so, Americans would be liable to 
punishment as pirates. After reading Washington’s Proclamation “Marcellus” wrote two 
more letters, defending his President. John Quincy stated that: 
 
As the citizens of a nation at a vast distance from the continent of Europe; of a 
nation whose happiness consists in a real independence, disconnected from all 
European interests and European politics, it is our duty to remain, the peaceable 
and silent, though sorrowful spectators of the sanguinary scene. (…) Surely, there 
would be something singularly absurd and iniquitous, to see the United States 
support the French in a plan of oppressive administration over their colonies, as a 
reward for rescuing them from the oppression of Great Britain.
166
 
 
These passages would later influence Washington’s Farewell Address, which also 
emphasized the importance of the United States to remain neutral from European politics.  
When Genet was recalled he did not return to France, but remained in the United 
States. There he continued to propagate the French cause and tried to convince the 
American people to join France as a neutral nation. John Quincy responded by writing as 
“Columbus” and branding Genet’s attempts as insurrection. Again, his letters would 
influence Washington’s Farewell Address. The following passage makes John Quincy’s 
disposition undeniably clear: 
 
Of all the dangers which encompass the liberties of a republican State, the intrusion 
of a foreign influence into the administration of their affairs, is the most alarming, 
and requires the opposition of the severest caution. (…) The interference of 
foreigners upon any pretense whatever, in the dissension of fellow-citizens, must 
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be as inevitably fatal to the liberties of the States, as the admission of strangers to 
arbitrate upon the domestic differences of man and wife is destructive to happiness 
of a private family. (…) If we inquire what is the cause which has been within a 
quarter of a century, fatal to the Liberties of Sweden, of Geneva, of Holland, and of 
Poland, the answer will be one and the same. It was the association of internal 
faction, and external power; it was the interference of other nations in their 
domestic divisions.
167
  
 
John Quincy would maintain his disposition on remaining neutral from European wars 
and politics throughout his life. His diplomatic mission to the Netherlands would 
strengthen his beliefs. A few days before he learned of his new diplomatic commission to 
The Hague he wrote his father that “it is of infinite importance that we should preserve 
peace, until war shall become our duty”.168 
 
 
3.2 – John Quincy Adams in the Batavian Republic 
 
John Quincy’s diplomatic mission to the Netherlands lasted from November 1794 to June 
1797. He was selected because he had defended American neutrality in the newspapers, 
and also because he already had diplomatic experiences from accompanying his father on 
missions to France and the Netherlands. President Washington would not regret 
nominating John Quincy as minister to the Dutch Republic. Washington would later tell 
John Adams that John Quincy’s letters from The Hague “disclose much important 
information and political insight” and that “things appear to me exactly as they do to your 
son”. A year later Washington even stated that John Quincy “is the most valuable public 
character we have abroad, and that there remains no doubt in my mind that he will prove 
himself to be the ablest of all our diplomatic corps”.169  
John Quincy was surprised to be nominated and reluctantly agreed; he feared that 
he was not mature enough for such an important responsibility. But he soon learned that 
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the American representative in the Netherlands had little more responsibility than to 
maintain friendly relations that had always existed with that Republic and to conduct for 
the government its longstanding financial business. Of the five diplomatic appointments 
of the United States abroad, that of the Netherlands was one of the least significant 
politically.
170
 
However, the outbreak of the French Revolution and its spread across Europe 
suddenly made The Hague a place of extraordinary significance, particularly for an 
American diplomat. John Adams wrote his son that he “will see Europe at the most 
interesting period of its history”.171 In 1787 most Dutch Patriots went into exile in France 
and only a few years later the French Revolution broke out there, which embraced many 
of the same political ideas advocated by the Patriots. They enthusiastically supported the 
Revolution and hoped to liberate their own country from the tyranny of the 
Stadtholderate. By the time John Quincy Adams arrived in the Dutch Republic in 
November 1794 the French armies were already advancing north: they were occupying 
important Dutch cities and chasing away the Stadtholder and most of his followers. By 
the summer of 1795 the Batavian regime, which included the returned Patriots and had 
excluded the supporters of the Stadtholder from public life, proceeded to build a new 
political order. The institutions of the Dutch old regime were dismantled at a rapid pace, 
the liberties and freedom of citizens would be safe-guarded, and a broadly elected 
national assembly met in The Hague. The most important task facing this assembly 
would be to establish a constitution for the new state. 
172
 
Besides being merely a listening-post for European politics, the Netherlands 
suddenly became a perfect place to observe France’s intentions to liberate peoples from 
their own governments and how the French treat their new allies. John Quincy’s most 
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important work at The Hague would prove to be that of reporting the course of the French 
intervention.
173
 
 
 
Evaluating the French intervention 
Prior to his departure to the Netherlands John Quincy visited the archives of the 
Department of State and read the diplomatic correspondence of his father. As mentioned 
before John Quincy idolized his father and thought him the most capable diplomat in 
Europe. He undoubtedly believed every word John Adams wrote in his correspondence, 
including the reports that seem exaggerated and one-sided. The more John Quincy read, 
the more he admired the way his father had seen through France’s “pernicious designs” 
and Vergennes’ “insidious” foreign policy. Before setting foot in The Hague John Quincy 
had already become convinced of Vergennes’ “contemptuous insolence, base malignity, 
and his perfidy to this Country’.174 His conviction of France’s self-interested character 
prior to his visit to the Netherlands, I believe, significantly influenced his perception of 
France’s actions, as will later on become clear.  
In 1795 John Quincy observed that the Dutch people seemed to have lost their 
sense of patriotism. In 1781 “the spirit of liberty predominated” among the Dutch people. 
But in 1787 the Patriot movement was defeated and the re-established government 
successfully constrained patriotism and any desires for liberty. By 1795 the Dutch people 
were characterized by “lifeless imbecility, passive obedience and non-resistance”. They 
were “indifferent to everything relating to theories of government” and were more 
interested in money and commerce. John Quincy feared that the Dutch people had “lost 
that energy of character which once so honourably distinguished them”. Furthermore, 
they lacked a sense of unity – with Dutch politics strongly divided – which is necessary 
for the defence of an invaded country. The animosity of the Patriot party against the re-
established government, and its constraints of liberties, had become so great since 1787 
that they would rather submit to the invading French army than make peace with the 
                                                 
173
 Bemis, John Quincy Adams, 40, 50-51, 58-9; Instructions for JQA, 29 July 1794, WJQA 1:198-201; 
JQA to Secretary of State, 2 Nov. 1794, WJQA 1:210; JQA to JA, 12 Feb. 1795, WJQA 1:278. 
174
 Bemis, John Quincy Adams, 40-41; JQA to JA, 16 July 1794, quoted in Bemis, John Quincy Adams, 40-
41; JQA to JA, 14 Jan. 1797, WJQA 2:86. 
65 
 
present government. According to John Quincy such internal disunion paved the way for 
the Netherlands to become a playing field for stronger European powers.
175
 
Nevertheless, at first sight the French intervention did not seem to have negative 
consequences for the Dutch people. When he first arrived in the Netherlands John Quincy 
observed that “the outward aspect of this country is not that of a nation invaded by a 
powerful and victorious army, (…) everything wears the appearance of peace and 
tranquillity”. The transition from the ancien regime to the Batavian Republic was 
relatively peaceful as no disorders, massacres, or pillages took place. When the capital 
Amsterdam was captured in January 1795 a proclamation to the Batavian people was 
published, declaring that the French came as friends and allies and that they would 
respect the individuality and independence of the Batavian people. The Dutch people 
would be given the opportunity to exercise sovereignty in reforming and modifying their 
own government. John Quincy, like most Americans, could wish for nothing more and 
was hopeful that the French intervention would be favourable for the liberties of the 
Dutch people.
176
 
Despite such a peaceful transition of sovereignty to the people, John Quincy soon 
enough became suspicious of French intentions. In a letter to the Secretary of State on 15 
February 1795 John Quincy first voiced his suspicion. Though the proclamation that the 
Dutch people would be able to reform their own government, he states “it is the spring 
unseen which gives all the visible motion to the Revolution in this country” and not the 
Dutch people. In the wake of the invading French army democratic societies based on 
Jacobin model sprang up all over the Netherlands. Smalls groups of revolutionaries allied 
to France – the spring unseen – were working behind the scenes using such organizations 
as instruments of revolution to supplant the old regime with the new Batavian Republic, 
based on French models. The “spring unseen” thus “concerted secretly the mode of 
                                                 
175
 JQA to Secretary of State, 2 Nov. 1794, WJQA 1:212; JQA to Secretary of State, 7 Nov. 1794, WJQA 
1:220; JQA to JA, 9 Nov. 1794, WJQA 1:224-7; JQA to Secretary of State, 2 Dec. 1794, WJQA 1:241-2; 
JQA to Secretary of State, 7 Apr. 1795, WJQA 1:320; JQA to Secretary of State, 1 May 1795, WJQA 1:338; 
JQA to Secretary of State, 25 June 1795, WJQA 1:368. 
176
 JQA to Secretary of State, 2 Nov. 1794, WJQA 1:210; JQA to Secretary of State, 19 Jan. 1795, WJQA 
1:261-2; JQA to Secretary of State, 22 Jan. 1795, WJQA 1:263-4; JQA to JA, 12 Feb. 1795, WJQA 1:276, 
280-1. The exact wording of the proclamation is quoted in WJQA 1:287-8: “We appear in the midst of you 
as your friends and allies. We do not come to subdue you. The French nation will respect your 
independence. The Batavian people in the exercise of their sovereignty can alone change or modify the 
form of their government.” 
66 
 
conducting the great political alterations” in the Batavian Republic. John Quincy finds it 
remarkable that “an administration resting its authority upon the foundation of universal 
suffrage consists of persons substantially chosen by a small revolutionary committee, and 
in whose appointment the people had not any agency other than that of acquiescence”. It 
appeared to John Quincy that the French had conquered the Netherlands, referring to the 
Dutch cities as being “taken” and “in the power of the French Republic”.  
John Quincy’s initial hope that the French would treat the Dutch people with 
benevolence had quickly changed into a fear that the French would incorporate the Dutch 
nation into their own. To John Quincy it had become undeniably clear that the French had 
arrived as conquerors. Such circumstances led him to compare the French intervention 
with the – detested – invasion of British-Prussian forces in 1787, which re-established the 
Stadtholder in the seat of government. According to John Quincy the character and 
patriotism of the Dutch people “has been broken by (…) submission to foreign armies, 
twice exhibited in the seven last years”.177 Before John Quincy arrived in the Netherlands 
he was already cautious of foreign powers influencing American politics. It seems that 
due to his experiences in the Netherlands he grew even more cautious as he observed 
first-hand how the French were influencing Dutch politics.    
Under the guise of revolution, John Quincy argues, the French replaced the old 
institutions and constitutions with new ones based on French model.
178
 But these changes 
did not cure the ailments that were troubling the old Dutch regime; “the same languor and 
imbecility which characterized the former government are equally discovered by the 
present”. In fact, the French intervention worsened the situation. John Quincy claimed 
that “this Republic may be said to be irretrievably ruined”. Even the people who initially 
so ardently received the French armies were becoming increasingly disappointed and 
dissatisfied with the new regime.
179
 Toward the end of his diplomatic service in the 
Netherlands in 1797 John Quincy reported the net result for unhappy Dutchmen of 
France’s revolutionizing of their country. Two years of so-called liberation had cost them 
nearly twenty per cent upon the whole capital of every individual in forced loans, the 
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suspension of almost all their commerce, the loss of their colonies, and the general 
depreciation by one half of almost all their other property. The French saviors turned out 
to be conquerors.
180
 
 
 
3.4 – The United States endangered 
 
During these years of turmoil John Quincy tried to maintain his independence and 
neutrality from European culture and politics. He was anxious about how European 
culture would afflict Americans residing in Europe. Just before he left for the Netherlands, 
John Quincy declared that “[t]he distance between the two countries is so great and the 
communication of course so small, that it is hardly possible for an American to be long in 
Europe without losing in some measure his national character”.181 In Europe, especially 
in Paris, he came across Americans who he considered to have lost their way. For 
example, John Quincy disapproved of the decadent behaviour of William Temple 
Franklin, Benjamin Franklin’s grandson and diplomatic secretary, and blamed it on the 
education and culture of Europe.
182
 John Quincy believed that such affliction of 
Americans went so far that ideas of French interference in American politics were 
“inspired by Americans in Paris, who foster and encourage it with all possible industry”. 
John Quincy insisted that most Americans in Europe have motives to favor the French 
cause. This favourable disposition towards France arose from the popularity of their 
struggle for liberty, French sympathies for Americans, and the amount of debt the French 
government owed American merchants and bankers. These incentives simulated 
Americans in Europe not only to wish France well, but also be sensible to contribute “to 
the furtherance of French views; and the conclusion of the whole matter is, that the whole 
weight and influence of such people in America are far from being friendly to the peace 
of the United States”. Americans in Europe were thus indoctrinated to side with France 
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rather than American national interest and neutrality.
183
 Furthermore, since the public 
opinion in the United States concerning European affairs was in considerable degree 
formed from the stories and letters of Americans in Europe, the rest of the American 
people living in the United States were also in danger of favoring the French cause. To 
John Quincy it was clear that “the greatest enemies of America in France are Americans 
themselves”.184 
The increasing political divisions in the United States were making matters worse. 
Not only were Americans in Europe losing their way, but at the same time Americans 
back home were increasingly siding with Republicans in support of the French 
Revolution and in opposition to the national government and Federalist policy. James 
Monroe’s diplomatic mission to Paris provides a good example of how the Federalist-
Republican divide was affecting American foreign policy and endangering the 
independence of the United States John Quincy so dearly wanted to maintain.  
In May 1794 James Monroe was nominated as minister to France by President 
Washington. As a Virginia delegate Monroe opposed ratification of the Constitution in 
1787, claiming that it gave too much power to the central government. In 1790 he was 
elected to the Senate, where he sided with the Jeffersonian opposition. Though Monroe 
was a partisan Republican, the spirit of factionalism did not appear quite as baneful to 
Washington in 1794 as it would two years later. Monroe would soon undermine the 
American government and the President’s policy of neutrality.185  
Monroe assumed, as he repeatedly told the French, that the interest of the United 
States is identical to that of the French republic. A shared interest of the sister republics 
was to humble British power. When Monroe arrived in Paris he already become 
convinced that Britain was inherently corrupt and stood on the point of collapse, which 
would be echoed in all his reports and reflected in all his acts. He made no secret of his 
sympathies for the “heroic valor” of the French forces in their war against Britain. He 
was rejoiced that “the fortune of France has risen to the utmost height of splendor, whilst 
that of her enemies has declined to the lowest state of depression. Her armies are every 
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where triumphant, whilst theirs are every where routed and broken.” Monroe would even 
advocate attacking Britain, emphasizing that France would come to the aid of the United 
States.
186
 
John Quincy Adams, on the other hand, argued that Britain was too powerful too 
attack, even for the combined armies of the United States and France. He reported that 
“the force of Great Britain is so far from being exhausted that her maritime power was 
never at any period so great as it is at present”. His report of the number of battle ships 
and army size contradicted Monroe’s reports and were closer to the truth – which would 
later be confirmed. It appears Monroe’s wish to undermine British power had clouded his 
judgment. John Quincy’s reports, Samuel Flagg Bemis argues, helped to correct the 
partisan impressions and advice of Monroe from Paris.
187
 
Monroe would continue to advocate military action against Britain, and to the 
French he continually downplayed the fact that John Jay was in Britain to avoid the war. 
When the Jay Treaty was published, Monroe was so personally opposed to it that he 
believed the great Franco-American alliance was in ruins. From this point it would 
become clear that his loyalty to France was more important than his loyalty to his 
President. In a letter to James Madison he attacked Washington, stating that “most of the 
monarchs of the earth practice ingratitude in their transactions with other powers (…) but 
Mr. Washington has the merit of transcending, not the great men of the antient republicks, 
but the little monarchs of the present day in preaching it as a publick virtue.” He assured 
French officials that after Jefferson would overthrow Washington in the upcoming 
presidential elections of 1796 everything will “be satisfactorily arranged”. 188  Monroe 
would eventually be recalled for not defending American neutrality and Jay’s Treaty.189 
John Quincy observed how political divisions, at home and abroad, and the French 
government’s intention to influence American policy would bring ruin to the United 
States. This intensified his belief that the United States should preserve its unity and 
remain independent from Europe.  
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French intentions and the Dutch example 
To John Quincy it was clear that involvement of the United States and Americans in 
European politics could only bring ruin. He desired to remain independent from 
European politics, even Dutch politics. John Quincy received multiple offers to join 
Patriot societies, but refused because he did not want to commit himself personally to 
Dutch politics. He grew increasingly suspicious of French influence in the Batavian 
Republic, believing that that the policy of the Patriot party and the Dutch government 
were dominated by France.
190
 John Quincy was also committed to remaining neutral from 
European politics in general. He believed that “in all the governments of Europe new and 
old the people are considered as an instrument, not as the object, of political calculations”. 
If the United States would engage themselves in European politics, the independence and 
liberties of the American people would be endangered.
191
 The American policy of 
neutrality proved to be so advantageous to the United States, that John Quincy wished 
above all that the United States “may never have occasion for any political connection in 
Europe”. Engaging in European politics would only inevitably drag the United States into 
wars and conflicts, bringing ruin to the country and its commerce.
192
  
The Dutch case, which confirmed and intensified John Quincy’s fears and desires, 
was the perfect example why Americans should remain neutral from European politics. 
In the Netherlands political disunion had provided the opportunity for foreign influences 
to intervene in Dutch politics, as became clear in 1787 and 1795. It seemed that the Dutch 
people lived in constant fear of foreign intervention and were “doomed to see their lot 
ascertained by the progress of events in which they have no participation”. Since the 
French intervention in 1795 they dominated Dutch politics and policy, causing the Dutch 
nation to become wholly dependent upon French benevolence. The Dutch government 
was established “upon the basis of French protection; that alone continues its existence”. 
The Dutch people “can have no avowed will different from that which may give 
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satisfaction to the government of France”.193 Such a situation should be avoided at all 
costs in the United States. 
The Federalists were primed to be suspicious of anything France did. Federalists, 
and other Americans, became convinced that French revolutionaries had infiltrated the 
United States through Democratic-Republican or Jacobin societies. In his sixth annual 
State of the Union in 1794 President Washington declared that in an effort to defeat the 
Federalist policy “certain self-created societies assumed the tone of condemnation”.194 
Many Americans became convinced that French revolutionaries and their Jacobin Clubs  
“aimed, in the very beginning, at overturning the whole world”. They “formed the design 
of bringing other nations to fraternize with them in their infernal principles and conduct” 
and “to subvert and overturn our holy religion and our free and excellent government”. 
The United States and France had become “a contest of liberty against despotism; (…) of 
civilized society against the destroyers of all social order”. These fears and suspicions 
persisted until at least the end of the century.
195
 
John Quincy Adams fed Federalist fears with reports from the Batavian Republic. 
He reported that France was working to undermine the Federalists by trying to bring 
about a “decisive rupture between us and Britain, and a consequent triumph of French 
party, French principles, and French influence in the United States”. After all, 
revolutionary France was setting up puppet regimes all over Europe, including the 
Netherlands.
196
 John Quincy feared that a similar situation of disunion and foreign 
influences in the Netherlands could afflict the United States if Americans would engage 
themselves in European politics. He noted that Americans could achieve “national 
greatness, if the union is preserved; but that if it is broken, we shall soon divide into a 
parcel of petty tribes at perpetual war with one another, swayed by rival European 
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powers”.197 John Quincy was especially fearful and suspicious of the French Directory, 
which did not favor the American union and whose policy seemed to be “to make use of 
the United States, as they are now making use of these [Dutch] Provinces”.198 From the 
French conduct towards other neutral powers “we may learn what course of policy we 
may expect from them”. John Quincy provides examples that in the past the French 
government has sought to entangle neutral powers in their wars, such as Sweden, 
Denmark, and the old Dutch Republic, or conquer them for plunder and spoils, such as 
Italian city-states and the Batavian Republic. Like with other neutral states France tried to 
involve the United States in their European wars.
199
  
In 1794 relations between the United States and Britain were deteriorating and 
war seemed likely, but Jay’s Treaty prevented the outbreak of war. A frustrated France 
hoped the United States would join them in their war with Britain, and tried its best to 
obstruct the treaty. France attempted to prevent ratification of the treaty by publically 
attacking President Washington’s credibility and position of power and by trying to 
influence American public opinion to support the French cause. John Quincy warned that 
France was trying to break political and commercial ties between the United States and 
Britain, leaving the United States isolated and increase the incentive to join France in its 
wars.
200
 He became convinced that France now desired “the destruction of our 
government and civil war in the United States”. France intended to win American support 
by force. According to John Quincy the French Directory was wholly convinced that “the 
people of the United Sates had but a feeble attachment to their government and will not 
support them in a contest with that of France”.201 John Quincy’s suspicions of France 
went so far that he believed the French would try to derive support from Southern states, 
creating a North-South division among the American people. France would then proceed, 
he believed, to form a “southern republic”: a union of Southern states France “would take 
under her protection and mould to her will” in order to serve as a balance against the 
Northern states. According to John Quincy such plans of influencing American policy 
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and creating a southern republic must have been formed as early as the time Genet was 
sent as a French representative.
202
 For John Quincy it was clear that France has “seriously 
resumed the plan of revolutionizing the whole world”. The United States should then do 
everything in its power to remain neutral from France, “or submit to the dictates of the 
Directory”.203 John Quincy’s experiences of French policy in the Netherlands and his 
suspicions of French intentions further intensified his wish to remain independent from 
foreign influences. 
 
 
3.4 – In the footsteps of John Adams 
 
During his diplomatic mission to the Netherlands John Adams observed that the once 
great Dutch Republic had replaced its quest for independence and patriotism with a desire 
for money and commerce. Yet, when the Dutch Patriot movement started to gain 
momentum after 1781 John gladly welcomed such acts of patriotism and John Quincy 
would later describe this period as when the spirit of liberty predominated among the 
Dutch people. Both Adamses were distraught when foreign armies were called upon to 
intervene and break the Patriot movement in 1787. In 1795, John Quincy observed, the 
Dutch people were again “lifeless and passive” and again unable to repel foreign 
influences.   
Both John and John Quincy attributed the possibility of foreign powers to 
intervene to the lack of unity among the Dutch people. A unity among the people is 
necessary to defend against foreign influences. Yet the Dutch people were caught up in 
political divisions – extensively discussed by both Adamses – which paved the way for 
the Netherlands to become the playing field for stronger European powers. In 1787 the 
Dutch people were unable to consolidate their differences and foreign powers were able 
to intervene. By 1795 the animosity of the Patriots against the re-established 
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Stadtholderate and the political divisions had become so great since 1787 that they would 
rather submit to the invading French army than make peace with the present government.  
During John Quincy’s diplomatic mission political divisions in the United States 
were intensifying. He feared that a similar situation of disunion and foreign influences as 
in the Netherlands could afflict the United States. Disunity would divide the nation into 
warring factions each swayed by rival European powers. Like his father, John Quincy 
had become especially suspicious of the French government and remained cautious of its 
every move. Father and son both feared the desire of France to influence Dutch politics 
and especially American national and foreign policy. John Quincy argued that the French 
government was controlling Dutch politics and feared the United States could follow the 
same fate. Only when the American unity is preserved can foreign intervention be 
avoided and can the United States achieve greatness.  
Though John Quincy attached great importance to preserving the friendship of 
France, he was also cautious of France’s expectation that the United States should be 
eternally grateful and would welcome French influence in American politics. John 
Quincy argued that the United States does not depend upon France for its liberty and 
independence, arguing that “if the French propose to themselves an influence in America 
by the assumption of a supercilious tone of negotiation, or by disregarding their 
stipulations, they will fail of success and lose much of the influence which they actually 
possess”. Like his father before him, he did not believe that the United States should be 
grateful to French aid. Instead the American government should cultivate a friendship 
with honor and dignity, and expect a similar return.
204
 John Quincy experienced himself 
what his father had written about in his diaries and letters.  
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Chapter 4: William Vans Murray, 1797-1801 
 
 
 
William Vans Murray, by Mather Brown, 1787 
 
 
Like John Quincy Adams, William Vans Murray (1760 – 1803) matured during the 
period of the American Revolution and became greatly interested in politics, diplomacy, 
and the science of government. After the war with Britain ended Murray moved to 
London in April 1784 to study law, where he became acquainted with John and John 
Quincy Adams. During three years abroad he became increasingly interested in politics 
and diplomacy and in 1787 he published his Political Sketches, a collection of six essays 
76 
 
defending the American experiment in response to French critics.
205
 For Murray the 
American Revolution served as a beacon of hope to the world and he considered the 
American political experiment as a test case for ideas about the distribution of power and 
the nature of government. Initially the new state governments of the United States were 
praised by French intellectuals, but in time some of them came to doubt that the 
American experiments could succeed. It held their attention nevertheless, and they started 
to publically criticize the experiments. Americans imbued with a sense of nationalism 
stemming from their revolutionary achievement, in turn, sought to refute the criticisms. 
Like John Adams’s A Defence of the Constitutions and Thomas Jefferson’s Notes on the 
State of Virginia, Murray’s Political Sketches was such a reaction to French critics. 
Murray’s Political Sketches was inscribed to John Adams, of whom Murray was always a 
devoted admirer and whose influence was evident throughout the work. Murray and John 
Adams were politically attuned to each other and shared many political beliefs, such as 
criticisms of popular government and supporting a strong executive.
206
  
In the fifth essay of Political Sketches Murray discusses the dangers of the 
European balance of power, which he calls “a system of hostile jealousy”. Treaties 
between European monarchs were “the most shameful bargains between disconcerted 
ambition and lawless force” and caused European nations to become entangled in 
inextricable relations. Had the treaties been formed with better intentions and under better 
circumstance “Europe would have been infinitely more enlightened and better cultivated 
than at present”. The American government, on the other hand, knew better than to 
become entangled with other nations and wished to retain its neutrality. Because of this 
policy the United States was geographically and politically removed from the European 
system of “hostile jealousy”.207 During his diplomatic mission Murray would work out 
plans to manipulate the balance of power to benefit the United States, keeping it safe 
from any involvement with European affairs and its corruption.   
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After completing his education in Britain in 1787, Murray returned to the United 
States and began his career in public service. From 1787 to 1791 Murray served in the 
Maryland general assembly, and from 1791 to 1797 he was elected and twice re-elected 
to Congress. Murray served three consecutive terms in the House of Representatives, 
during which he earned the reputation of being an able statesman and devoted Federalist. 
Though he rose to a position of prominence in the Federalist Party, he never quite 
counted as a Federalist insider. Elkins and McKitrick attribute this to the close and long-
standing connection he had with the Adamses, who were more moderate than – and 
clashed with – the more eminent Federalists such as Alexander Hamilton. During the 
presidential elections of 1796 he was a leading campaigner for John Adams against 
Thomas Jefferson. Murray’s merit had caught President Washington’s eye and as one of 
the last acts of his administration he appointed Murray as Minister to the Batavian 
Republic to succeed John Quincy Adams in 1797.
208
  
 
 
4.1 – William Vans Murray in the Batavian Republic 
 
A month before Murray’s appointment Vice President John Adams requested Secretary 
of State Timothy Pickering to “test Murray’s allegiance” before he could enter public 
service. At a meeting with Pickering, Murray was shown old diplomatic files from the 
war with Britain which testified the “ill will” of France towards the United States. 
Murray was outraged by France’s actions – as his diary entry of that day professes – and 
had passed the test. Knowledge of France’s “ill will” from the past had undoubtedly 
made Murray cautious of France’s future actions.209 Additionally, he was personally and 
politically acquainted to John and John Quincy Adams, who had grown suspicious of 
France as well. Murray regularly corresponded with them and was warned by John 
Quincy – and likely by John Adams as well – to be on his guard when dealing with the 
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French.
210
 It appears that even before Murray had set foot on Dutch soil he had already 
learned to be cautious of French intentions.  
Murray was also cautioned about Americans residing in France. A few days 
before his departure, Murray was informed by the Dutch minister in the United States 
that his predecessor, John Quincy Adams, had become unpopular. Not because of any 
misconduct, but because the American Jacobins had pinned a pro-British label on him. 
Though the Dutch minister informed Murray that the Batavian regime did not consider 
him either British or French, Murray suspected that he would undoubtedly suffer the 
same fate.
211
 Murray soon learned he was right to be cautious. He noted that Americans 
in France wrote home that the French Directory was well disposed of Americans and the 
United States. Murray warned about the dangerous effects such reports could have, 
stressing that “every captain fishes up a budget of this sort of trash which in five months 
we see circulated as recent intelligence from Europe throughout the Union. These are in 
their origin small things, but in their effect upon the hopes and expectations of the 
newspaper readers and common people are very important.”212 Murray knew better than 
to trust such reports. 
 
A touch of war fever 
Murray arrived in The Hague at a very critical period. The signing of the Jay Treaty had 
angered the French, who considered the treaty a step toward an alliance with their 
English enemy and as a violation of the Franco-American Treaty of 1778. France and the 
United States were seizing each other’s ships and were on the verge of declared war. 
Murray’s instructions from the Secretary of State emphasized that his position at The 
Hague provided him with the best opportunity to obtain information on the views and 
designs of European rulers, especially those of France. Additionally, Murray’s “principal 
duty” was to maintain the harmony and useful connections between the United States and 
the Batavian Republic. The American government feared that France’s influence in the 
Batavian government would drag the Batavian Republic into its conflicts against the 
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United States, damaging American-Dutch political and especially economic relations. 
Remaining neutral and avoiding conflict seemed to best serve American national interest. 
Neutrality from European affairs would maintain harmony with both the French and 
Batavian Republic and leave American commerce undamaged.
213
 
But Federalists, including Murray, were beginning to see no alternative to war 
should France completely close down the channels of diplomacy and continue to interfere 
with American policy. Murray’s first few letters from The Hague to John Quincy Adams 
mainly stressed his growing suspicions of France and its attempts to divide the American 
union. According to Murray France was trying to convince the American people of its 
love of the United States – for instance through Americans in Europe writing home and 
Frenchmen in the United States propagating the French cause – but in the meantime 
counted upon the party difference “as the lever by which the Union is to be overthrown”. 
Murray believed that the French would not “give up their experiment of dividing and 
revolutionising America, unless something occurred among their war affairs in Europe 
that would raise our importance in their eyes and make our trade and neutrality essential 
to their colonies”. Murray intended to halt the spread of revolutionary France’s ideals and 
save the United States from ruin at the hands of France. During the fall of 1797 until the 
spring of 1798 Murray caught something Hill appropriately calls “a touch of war fever”. 
In his correspondence Murray discussed plans to shift the European balance of power to 
the advantage of the United States. With a fear of an upcoming rupture with France in the 
back of his mind, Murray was “convinced we must do more than defend ourselves. We 
must inflict pains and horrors, if we would be hereafter at peace and save our excellent 
constitutions from the pestilence of the spoiler and poisoner” (i.e. France).214 It was the 
only way, Murray believed, France could be stopped in its tracks.  
Another part of his plan was to strengthen the bonds with Britain. Murray 
believed that “cooperation without alliance”’ with Britain could aid the United States in 
the seemingly inevitable conflict with France. Such cooperation against a common enemy 
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would “work out our safety cheaply and with great conformity to the public feelings in 
the United States”. Murray, like many Americans, wanted to avoid any political 
attachments and alliances, so the cooperation would be limited to military aid. But when 
serious talks of cooperation occurred President John Adams feared that it would “tie his 
hands”, something he sought to avoid.215 Having second thoughts, Murray agreed with 
the President but more importantly also noted an even bigger disadvantage of cooperation 
with Britain. Murray argued that in an open war with France, and consequently the 
Batavian Republic, Britain would seize the opportunity to take over French and Dutch 
colonies in the Caribbean. This would disproportionately aggrandize British power, 
which was the opposite of Murray’s intention. Though France would grow weaker, 
another great European power would grow even stronger. In order for the European 
balance of power to work to the advantage of the United States, weaker European powers 
must grow stronger at the cost of the stronger powers and form a more equal balance of 
power. For this purpose Murray came up with another plan, which he referred to as his 
“projet”. Murray stuck to the plan of having other European powers seize the Dutch and 
French colonies in the Caribbean, but this time by weaker European power, such as 
Sweden or Denmark. Murray noted that “the avoidance of the evil to the U.S., which 
might arise from too great an aggrandisement of Great-Britain, would be the transfer of 
the colonies to other powers”. These lesser European powers would not threaten the 
safety and security of the United States, even with Caribbean colonies under their 
control.
216
 
Though Murray’s plans were not adopted and quickly abandoned on advice of 
John Quincy Adams, they show that Murray was primarily concerned with American 
national interest and saving the United States from the corruption of Europe. If the United 
States could not remain neutral from European affairs, Murray intended to use the 
balance of power in its favor. Weakening France, while not strengthening other European 
powers too much in the process, would halt the spread of the French Directory’s ideals 
and keep the United States save.  
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French influence in the Batavian Republic 
Murray started to increasingly distrust the French Directory and believed that the 
Batavian Republic had little chance of escaping French influence. This becomes evident 
in Murray’s discussion of a coup d’etat and the subsequent adoption of a new 
constitution. On 22 January 1798 Murray witnessed a coup in the Dutch National 
Assembly, writing to John Quincy Adams that “a revolution took place this day here in 
which the moderates are overturned and many of them now confined under military 
guard”. The Dutch Radicals had unseated the Moderate regime and established a 
provisional government more in line with the French disposition at the time. For Murray 
the radicals were undoubtedly backed by the Directory in Paris. In a letter to John Quincy 
Adams Murray describes that last October a “French gentleman” was sent to the Batavian 
Republic “to explore this country, its parties, and the causes why the constitution issued 
in August failed”. The French Directory “wished to know how power could be better 
concentrated for her use, the shortest method of doing this, and the probable degree of 
opposition, if attempted”. Murray believed that since October the Directory was planning 
the coup, and in the meantime additional French troops were sent to The Hague. It was 
clear to Murray that the new Radical regime was an instrument of France. While the 
Moderates preferred that the individual provinces should retain some of their power and 
favored a better balance between the executive and legislative powers, the Radicals 
desired a powerful unitary regime in which the legislature would play a major role. For 
the French Directory the Radicals’ desire to create a more centralized government would 
make it easier for Paris to control The Hague and force its will upon Dutch politics. The 
coup then strengthened the French hold on the Batavian government.
217
 
The way a new constitution was adopted also confirmed Murray’s fear that the 
French Directory was attempting to dominate Dutch politics. For instance, Murray found 
it disturbing that the Franco-Batavian solidarity was to be written into the constitution, 
finalizing the French Directory’s influence over Dutch politics. What concerned Murray 
even more was that the constitution was generated and adopted by a select few who were 
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“of the spirit of 22d January”, yet announcing it to be the act of the sovereign people. 
Murray was distraught about the way this constitution was adopted, stating that “it is 
necessary to congratulate upon such occasions, as it would be if a lady were known by all 
the world to have been ravished and the marriage ceremony performed to save life and 
reputation on both sides”.218 The Dutch people were being oppressed and deceived into 
an economic and political alliance with France.
219
 
Yet, the new regime of Radicals was becoming increasingly unpopular: the old 
provincial estates blocked voting themselves into oblivion; the relatively debt-free 
provinces objected to sharing the economic burden; and the people publicly demonstrated 
against the purging of the Moderates from the regime. But Murray’s hope that a 
restoration of the Moderates would free the Batavian Republic from French influence was 
idle. A counter-coup of the Moderates in June had overthrown the Radicals, but only with 
the explicit permission of Paris. To Murray it seemed impossible for the Batavian people 
to escape French influence.
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John Quincy Adams and William Vans Murray in the historiography of the Batavian 
Republic 
As something of a side-note, it seems that the correspondences of John Quincy Adams 
and William Vans Murray could contribute to an ongoing debate over foreign influences 
in the Batavian Republic. At the turn of the twentieth century Colenbrander argued that 
the Batavian Republic was nothing more than a client state of France with very limited 
freedom. After all, the Batavian Republic owed its existence to the French army invading 
the Dutch Republic. A part of the French army stayed behind, as well as a French 
political envoy that remained at the heart of Batavian politics. The French presence, 
combined with the demand of a compensation fee for their aid, was evidence enough that 
the liberation was actually an occupation.
221
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This view was challenged after the Second World War by, among others, Pieter 
Geyl. He, and those who agree with him, do not deny the French influence, but rather 
emphasize that the Dutch revolutionaries had a large degree of autonomy. They stress the 
importance of internal debates and the freedom of movement enjoyed by the Dutch until 
at least 1800. The French may have set some conditions, but the Dutch were free in 
shaping their new political order.
222
  
However, studying the correspondence of John Quincy Adams and William Vans 
Murray indicates that the Batavian people were quite restricted in their movement and 
liberties. Both diplomats argue that the political decisions of the Batavian Republic were 
controlled or at least approved of by the French Directory. In the early years of the 
Batavian Republic John Quincy argues that is was the “spring unseen” – a small group of 
revolutionaries allied to France – that orchestrated the replacement of the old regime with 
the new regime based on a French model. John Quincy concluded that the French had 
come as conquerors instead of liberators, like Colenbrander argued. Under the control of 
France the Dutch people were worse off. Later, Murray similarly argued that the Batavian 
government was controlled by the French Directory, confirming John Quincy’s view. 
Especially the coups, counter-coups, and constitutions were the work of the French. 
Murray believed that the Dutch people were being deceived and oppressed into an 
economic and political alliance with France. It seemed impossible for the Dutch to escape 
French influence.  
The views of John Quincy and Murray could then provide a fresh perspective on 
the historiography of the Batavian Republic. Their views seem to support Colenbrander’s 
thesis that the Batavian Republic was controlled by the French Directory, and challenge 
the more accepted thesis of Geyl and others that the Dutch were free in shaping their new 
political order.  
 
 
 
                                                 
222
 P. Geyl, Geschiedenis van de Nederlandse stam (3 vols.; Amsterdam en Antwerp 1948-59) 3:7; Schama, 
Patriotten en bevrijders, 176-181. The works of L. de Gou on the establishment of Batavian constitutions 
followed the same line of reasoning, including Het plan van constitutie van 1796 (The Hague 1975), Het 
ontwerp van constitutie van 1797 (3 vols.; The Hague 1983-1985), De staatsregeling van 1798 (2 vols.; 
The Hague 1988-1990), and De staatsregeling van 1801 (The Hague 1995). 
84 
 
Beacons of hope against spreading corruption 
Murray was unhappy about the political situation in Europe to say the least. He argued 
that the people of Europe were being deluded with promises of liberty and sovereignty. 
Such promises were merely “intended by the philosophers of Europe as a means of 
rooting out royalty from the heart of man, for they first dub the people as the sovereign 
and call him so while they trample him in the mud of misery and contempt”. In Europe 
liberty “is not the right of doing what is proper, but whatever those in power please – the 
old despotism new dramatized”. Murray considered, like many Americans, the United 
States as one of the last remaining beacons of hope against the corruption and evil of 
Europe. The liberties and freedom of the American people should be protected against 
European intrusion at all costs.
223
  
 The French Directory was the prime example of the corruption of Europe.  By 
mid-1798 Murray had acquired a profound distrust of revolutionary France. He had 
rejoiced over the first upheavals, but was soon horrified by the revolutionaries uprooting 
institutions, indulging in bloodshed, and conquering nations in name of liberty and 
fraternity. The French Directory used fear as a tool to command its subjects, which “the 
horror of Robespierre’s reign settled as the foundation of the republican power of 
France”. Similar to many Federalists, Murray started to lean toward the stereotype that all 
revolutionaries were natural disorganizers and used the term “Jacobin” without 
differentiation to describe loosely any group or individual proposing radical change. 
Murray’s experiences at The Hague confirmed his belief that wherever French 
revolutionaries or their ideals appeared in strength, nations lost their internal political 
stability and their international independence. He was “convinced that all the affiliated 
and conquered countries groan under a military despotism and that France and her 
demagogues are the cause of this”. The French Directory’s “system established in the 
affiliated countries is so little plausible in practise (…) it can not last. It is too much 
opposed to common sense, to the natural feelings, which pervade the mass, though not 
the philosophers”. Murray believed that by using war and intrigue Revolutionary France 
would not rest until all monarchies became republics, and all republics were cast in the 
                                                 
223
 WVM to JQA, 12 Mar. 1798, Annual Report, 383-6; WVM to JQA, 19 Mar. 1798, Annual Report, 390-
91. 
85 
 
French mold. Like John Quincy before him, Murray believed the French were returning 
to their plan to revolutionize the world.
224
 
For Murray there was no hope for the sovereignty and liberties of the European 
people, save perhaps of the Dutch. In his final years as a diplomat Murray stated that 
“indeed on the point of relative civilization I doubt if, Holland excepted, there be any 
nation in Europe as civilized as our country”.225 But as long as the Batavian Republic was 
under influence of the French Directory there was little hope for the Dutch civilization. 
Murray believed that only the support of Britain, and the exiled supporters of the 
Stadtholderate, could bring salvation to the Dutch people. The Dutch supporters of the 
Stadtholderate and British partisans should rally to the new moderate regime and help it 
to throw off French patronage. Both parties should abandon their desire to revive the 
position of the Stadtholder and come to grips with reality. The Dutch royalists “have lost 
their gilded yacht, they are in the water, and ought to be happy if they can save 
themselves in the long boat”. Their primary mission should be to loosen the Batavian 
Republic from French influence and restore its independence. An independent Batavian 
Republic free from the French Directory’s hold would stand as a bulwark against the 
spread of revolutionary France’s destructive ideals. More importantly, the safety of the 
United States from European corruption could then be guaranteed. 
Murray’s plans were again quickly rejected by John Quincy, who stated that the 
Dutch were too passive to shed any blood for their independence. Though Murray had 
hoped the Batavian Republic would again be independent, he had also observed that the 
Dutch showed little resistance to the French encroachment in their affairs. Like John and 
John Quincy Adams had observed before, the Dutch seemed to lack a spirit of patriotism. 
During the coup the Dutch people allowed their “mock sovereignty” to be dragged to the 
scaffold without resistance, and with only 1500 French troops in the capital. The Dutch 
“are as cautious as if a French grenadier had his bayonet at their bosoms”. With the coup 
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the French Directory took another step towards completely controlling the Batavian 
government. 
226
 
 John Quincy Adams also argued that the British would not abandon the Prince of 
Orange, who seemed to be the only sovereign on continental Europe willing to ally with 
Britain. Despite the plan’s dismissal, it showed Murray’s desire to halt or at least slow 
down the spread of revolutionary France’s ideals across Europe, and especially to the 
United States, by freeing the Batavian Republic from French influence. Again Murray 
intended to use the balance of power to the advantage of the United States. A weaker 
France and an independent Batavian Republic – willing to trade with the United States – 
would benefit American national interest.
227
 
 
 
4.2 – On the verge of war 
 
During Murray’s diplomatic mission the division at home between Federalists and 
Republicans reached its peak and France was becoming increasingly hostile towards the 
United States. Federalists feared for their position of power and were becoming 
increasingly suspicious of Republican and French activities and intentions. The reports of 
Murray, and previous reports from John and John Quincy, undoubtedly fueled those 
suspicions.  
In 1776 Americans revolutionaries were dedicated to creating a republic which 
would secure their liberty and inalienable human rights. The United States would be an 
asylum for the oppressed and persecuted of all nations. But in the 1790s the ideas about 
citizenship would change. After the signing of the Jay Treaty Franco-American relations 
were increasingly deteriorating. After John Adams’s presidential victory, France 
abandoned its earlier efforts to divide Americans politically and decided to confront the 
United States directly. France started to seize American ships and a war with the United 
States seemed inevitable. What made matters worse was the steady growth of the pro-
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French Republican Party. The many immigrants that entered the United States year after 
year generally supported the Republicans, which continuously increased the number of 
followers of the Republican Party. The belief that the United States would soon be 
involved in a war with France and the growth of Republican opposition, which supported 
revolutionary France’s ideas, had the Federalists on edge. Many Federalists became 
convinced that the survival of the federal government required restrictions and controls 
on immigrants. Federalists dealt with this threat by restricting naturalization of 
immigrants and the rights of aliens. 
In 1790 Congress had passed a naturalization act requiring only two years of 
residency, but in light of the French Revolution the time of residency was increased to 
five years and immigrants had to show proof of their devotion to the American 
Constitution. The impending war with France, and fear of a French invasion, struck fear 
in the hearts of the Federalists and any optimism in welcoming foreign immigrants was 
gone. In 1798 a new naturalization act was adopted, extending the required time of 
residency to 14 years and forbade any subjects of a nation at war with the United States 
to become an American citizen. Expelling aliens and halting immigrants were part of the 
Federalists’ plans to save the American Republic from the scourge of Jacobinism. 
Unfortunately, the Federalists’ policies meant challenging the revolutionary idea 
that the United States was an asylum of liberty for the oppressed of the world. These 
seemingly counter-revolutionary ideas met with great resistance by the American people. 
When a British naval victory of the French in October 1798 essentially destroyed the 
possibility of a French invasion of either England or the United States, the threat of a 
French invasion was gone and the Federalists lost much of the rationale for their program. 
The controversial acts would irreversibly damage the credibility of the Federalists and 
seriously endangered Federalist prospects for the upcoming presidential election in 1800. 
Yet, however disastrous this act turned out to be for the Federalists’ reputation, at the 
time it appeared to be necessary for the protection of the country.
228
  
It seems likely that the experiences and reports of the three diplomats fueled 
Federalists’ fears of Republicans and French revolutionaries, and influenced American 
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immigration policy in the 1790s. By the time the acts were passed John Adams had 
become President, and John Quincy and Murray were on diplomatic missions in Europe 
in respectively Prussia and the Batavian Republic. John had already become suspicious of 
French intentions during his diplomatic missions and during his Presidency he was 
constantly reminded by John Quincy and Murray of the dangers France presented. Their 
reports were full of warnings that France intended to revolutionize the world and 
influence American policy. Even after he moved to Prussia, John Quincy would warn his 
father and other Federalists that France intended to drag the United States into war.
229
  
 
Peace negotiations 
In 1798 President John Adams hoped to settle the dispute with France and sent three 
American envoys to Paris, but they were unsuccessful in their efforts. France declared 
that American neutrality was no longer possible, and that all nations must aid France or 
be treated as enemies. The United States and France formally halted all treaty obligations 
and trade, and openly attacked each other’s ships. Undeclared war on the high seas broke 
out between the United States and France, the so called Quasi-War (1798-1800), which 
could have become a major conflict at any moment. The Batavian government also 
wished to avoid a Franco-American conflict, fearing it would be dragged into a war. But 
even though no Dutch faction actively wanted war with the United States, Dutch 
neutrality could not be counted on as long as French influence prevailed. If France should 
insist, the Batavian Republic would comply. The new regime was as well-disposed with 
the United States as they dared to be.
230
  
By the summer of 1798 France’s internal financial and political situation was 
worsening. The French Directory, like the American and Batavian governments, intended 
to resolve the conflict. The French diplomat Pichon was sent to The Hague to assure 
Murray and the American government that France had good intentions. Pichon told 
Murray “that the eyes of his government were opened, that they saw the full importance 
of putting an end to the dispute”. But even after numerous assurances of Pichon that 
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France had good intentions, Murray remained skeptical. He was still cautious of French 
intentions, stressing that France wishes “merely to divide and bewilder, and to relax our 
energy”. All past performances undoubtedly justified watchful pessimism. Nevertheless, 
Murray was sent to France along with other delegates for another attempt to settle the 
disputes between France and the United States in 1800. Primarily in consequence of the 
talks between Pichon and Murray, President Adams felt assured that the French were 
indeed prepared to negotiate in good terms. This time the negotiations were successful 
and a treaty was signed in September of the same year, ending the Quasi-War and 
relieving the tensions between France and the United States.
231
 
 
After a brief return to The Hague, Murray was recalled in December 1801 by the newly 
elected President Thomas Jefferson. To the new administration it was obvious that the 
Batavian Republic was controlled by France; Murray’s reports were overflown with 
distrust of the French Directory and its influence in the Batavian government.
232
 
 
 
4.3 – The last in line 
 
William Vans Murray was the last diplomat before the diplomatic mission in the 
Netherlands was discontinued in 1801. Like John and John Quincy before him, Murray 
grew suspicious of French intentions.  Murray started his diplomatic mission at a time 
when tensions between the United States and France were running high and the political 
divisions at home were intensifying, which reinforced each other. Murray was thus 
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instructed to keep an eye on France. Before he left for the Netherlands Murray had 
already become suspicious of French intentions, and his experiences in the Batavian 
Republic were confirming his suspicions. The processes behind coups, constitutions, and 
counter-coups convinced Murray that the French Directory was not to be trusted and that 
the Batavian regime was under French control.  Consequently, the new regime was as 
well-disposed with the United States as they dared to be. Though Murray believed the 
Dutch were different from other, corrupted European people, he had little hope for them 
as long as the Batavian Republic was under influence of the French Directory. There was 
little hope that the Dutch people would again be independent, since the Dutch showed 
little resistance to the French encroachment in their affairs. Like John and John Quincy 
had observed before, the Dutch seemed to lack a spirit of patriotism.  
Murray joined John and John Quincy in their belief that the United States should 
remain independent from European politics. In order to preserve the American unity and 
avoid foreign influences, the American government should not become entangled in 
European affairs. In his Political Sketches Murray already expressed his aversion to the 
European system of politics and “hostile jealousy”. To Murray the United States was one 
of the last beacons of hope against European corruption.  He also joined his predecessors 
in their fear that France intended to influence American policy. After all, French 
revolutionaries planned to revolutionize the world and were already setting their plans 
into motion in Europe. Initially Murray hoped to avoid any hostility with France, or any 
other European power, and maintain American neutrality.  
But Murray was beginning to see no alternative to war should France close down 
the channels of diplomacy and continue to interfere with American policy. While his 
predecessors continuously believed that the United States would be safe from conflict and 
corruption as long as it remained neutral, Murray saw no other choice but to “inflict pains 
and horrors” on France. Murray would work out plans to manipulate the balance of 
power to the advantage of the United States. He planned to weaken France, while not 
strengthening other European powers too much in the process, and halt the spread of the 
French Directory’s ideals across Europe and the Atlantic. Murray’s hope of an 
independent and neutral Batavian Republic was in part fueled by the intention that it 
would serve as a bulwark against French revolutionary ideas. Even when the French 
91 
 
government did it best to convince the American government of its intention to make 
peace, Murray still remained cautious of their intentions. He believed that France merely 
intended to deceive and to catch the United States off guard. The liberties and freedom of 
the American people should be protected at all costs. 
The subject of factionalism and political divisions is not as prominent in Murray’s 
correspondence as it was in the writings of his predecessors. Back home the divisions 
between Federalists and Republicans were reaching its peak, which could not have been 
far from his mind. To be sure, Murray discusses the political divisions surrounding the 
coups, counter-coups, and the debates over the new constitutions. But he concluded that it 
was the work of the French, and the Dutch people were hardly involved. He was more 
interested in the influence the French Directory was exerting on Dutch politics, and how 
French patronage could be thrown off. Murray believed that a strong Dutch unity could 
free the Batavian Republic from French influence. Only when the supporters of the 
Stadtholderate and British partisans gave up their hope of restoring the power of the 
Stadtholder and rally behind the regime of the Moderates, could the Dutch people be 
saved. Though Murray does not extensively discuss factionalism, he does conclude that a 
strong unity among the people was necessary to preserve its liberties and independence.  
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Discussion & Conclusion 
 
This paper investigated what lessons the United States could learn from the Netherlands 
at the end of the eighteenth century and to what extent the Netherlands could serve as an 
example for the new American nation. In order to do so, this paper focused on the 
correspondence, both official and private, and personal documents such as diaries of the 
three diplomats stationed in the Netherlands from 1780 to 1801: John Adams, John 
Quincy Adams, and William Vans Murray.  
Diplomats were an important and relatively reliable source of information for the 
American government. They regularly reported on European affairs that were of 
importance to the United States and could affect American national and foreign policy. 
One of the American diplomatic missions was established in the Netherlands. The Dutch 
Republic was an important center of European diplomacy as well as an international 
credit market. Many eighteenth-century Americans, including the three diplomats, 
believed that the Dutch Republic was useful as an ally as well as an example for state-
building.  
All three diplomats stationed in the Netherlands were established and respected 
statesmen and received important votes of confidence from their peers and political 
superiors. Additionally, the situation in the Netherlands was becoming increasingly 
important to the United States and all three diplomats were stationed there during critical 
periods of American state-building and foreign affairs. Their diplomatic reports, and any 
words of caution or praise, would then not be taken lightly. Investigating the official and 
private correspondence of these three diplomats provides an insight into what 
preoccupied the minds of eighteenth-century Americans. Through the eyes of American 
diplomats in the Netherlands this paper has attempted to uncover how eighteenth-century 
Americans viewed Europe and what they could learn from the events in the Netherlands.  
Despite the apparent importance of the Netherlands to the United State during the 
final decades of the eighteenth century, not much has been written on how the 
Netherlands could serve as an example to the United States. Moreover, previous studies 
of Dutch-American relations in the eighteenth century tend to ignore or overlook the 
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diplomatic relations between 1780 and 1801. They primarily focus on economic and 
trade relations or on diplomatic relations up to the Dutch recognition of American 
independence in 1782. Yet, the political developments in Europe and the Netherlands 
were becoming increasingly important because they could affect American politics as 
well. Thus, the diplomatic relations between the United States and the Netherlands were 
also becoming increasingly important. This paper attempts to provide an overview and a 
more complete picture of Dutch-American diplomatic relations in the final decades of the 
eighteenth century, focusing on what the Netherlands meant to eighteenth-century 
Americans and the newly formed United States.  
 
John Adams was the first American diplomat sent to the Netherlands. During his 
missions in France he came to believe that the French government intended to influence 
American policy. Even after he left for the Netherlands, John believed, his mission was 
being sabotaged. But despite French counteraction John was still hopeful the Dutch 
Republic would come to the aid of the United States. That hope was quickly shattered 
after a few months in the Netherlands. He observed that the republic had sunk in ease and 
was more interested in commerce than in liberty and the American cause. The Dutch 
people were politically divided and were ruled by the tyranny of the Stadtholder and the 
British crown. John experienced how factionalism and subjugations to foreign influences 
had brought ruin to the Dutch Republic. He feared that a similar situation could occur in 
the United States. A balanced constitution and government would have saved the Dutch 
Republic, and could still save the United States. Though the recognition of American 
independence, the breaking of the tradition of revering Britain, and the signs of a new 
political movement striving for reforms had given John a brief hope that the Dutch 
Republic could still be saved, foreign intervention in 1787 quickly shattered that hope. It 
seemed that because the Dutch Republic had sunk in ease and afflicted by factionalism 
the way was paved for foreign intervention at the hands of England and Prussia.  
John Quincy Adams would follow in the footsteps of John Adams, addressing 
mainly the same subjects as his father did before him. In 1795 John Quincy had observed 
that the Dutch people were lifeless and passive, similar to his father’s observation that the 
Dutch Republic had sunk in ease. In both 1781 and 1795 the Dutch people were unable to 
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consolidate their differences which provided the opportunity for foreign powers to 
intervene. The Dutch people lacked a sense of unity among them necessary to defend 
against foreign influences. Prior to his departure to the Netherlands John Quincy had 
become convinced of the ill will of the French by reading old diplomatic files, including 
John Adams’s diplomatic correspondence from France and the Netherlands. Similar to 
his father, even before he had set foot in the Netherlands and observed the establishment 
of the Batavian Republic John Quincy had learned to be suspicious of French intentions. 
During John Quincy’s diplomatic mission political divisions in the United States were 
intensifying. John Quincy feared that a similar situation of disunion and foreign 
influences as in the Netherlands could afflict the United States. He especially feared that 
France would influence American policy, as he observed how the French were 
controlling Dutch politics. John Quincy had become convinced that the French had 
conquered the Dutch Republic and intended to revolutionize the world, including the 
United States. He believed that only by preserving the American unity, and thus avoiding 
factionalism, could foreign intervention be avoided. Like his father, John Quincy 
intended to preserve the friendship with France, but remained cautious of being eternally 
grateful to France and welcoming French influence in American politics. John and John 
Quincy shared the same beliefs and fears when it comes to factionalism and American 
policy, and it seems that John Quicny experienced himself what his father had written 
and warned about in his diplomatic correspondence.  
William Vans Murray was the last diplomat before the diplomatic station in the 
Netherlands was discontinued in 1801. He began his diplomatic mission at a time when 
tensions between the United States and France were running high and the political 
divisions at home were intensifying, which reinforced each other. Similar to John and 
John Quincy, Murray had become cautious of French intentions and during his mission in 
the Netherlands he grew even more suspicious. Murray observed how coups, counter-
coups, and constitutions were orchestrated by the French Directory. Murray had little 
hope that the Batavian Republic could be saved from French influence, as he observed 
how the Dutch people lacked a sense of patriotism and showed little resistance to French 
encroachment in their affairs.  
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Even more so than John and John Quincy, Murray believed that the United States 
should be protected against the corruption of Europe and especially France. After all, 
French revolutionaries intended to revolutionize the world and influence American 
policy. Initially Murray hoped the United States would avoid any hostility with France 
and maintain its neutrality. But he was beginning to see no alternative to war should 
France continue to interfere with American policy. Murray set up plans to inflict pains 
and horrors on France in order to keep American independence intact. He also hoped the 
Batavian people would cast off French patronage and serve as a bulwark against France’s 
revolutionary ideals. Murray became convinced that France merely intended to deceive 
and control the American people like it was doing to the Dutch people. The liberties and 
freedom of the American people should be protected at all costs. 
The subject of factionalism has received less attention in Murray’s writings than 
in the correspondence of his predecessors. Yet, back home the divisions between 
Federalists and Republicans were reaching its peak, which could not have been far from 
his mind. What he did emphasize was that a sense of unity is required to maintain 
independence. For instance, he believed that only when the supporters of the 
Stadtholderate rallied behind the moderate Patriot regime, and thus created unity among 
the Dutch people, could the Batavian Republic be set free from French influence. Murray 
believed the same applied to the United States; only a strong American unity could 
preserve the independence of the United States.   
 
In 1780 John Adams first observed how the Dutch Republic had sunk in ease and in 1795 
John Quincy Adams observed that the Dutch people were again lifeless and passive. They 
were more interested in commerce than in their liberties and they were politically 
divided. They lacked a sense of patriotism and a sense of unity which the diplomats 
believed were necessary to repel foreign influences and remain independent.  John 
Quincy and Murray observed how under the guise of liberators the French had taken over 
control of Dutch politics. Only when the Dutch people became united, Murray believed, 
could they cast off French patronage and once again be independent.  
 The three diplomats quickly came to believe that the United States should remain 
independent from European affairs and should avoid any political entanglement with 
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Europe. Their experiences in the Netherlands would confirm and intensify such desires. 
Factionalism had brought ruin to the Netherlands and paved the way for foreign powers 
to influence, and control, national and foreign policy. As political divisions were 
intensifying back home, the diplomats increasingly feared what they observed in the 
Netherlands could also afflict the United States.  
They had become especially suspicious of France. Even before they had set foot 
in the Netherlands, all three diplomats had in one way or another learned to be cautious 
of French actions and intentions. Their experiences in the Netherlands further increased 
their suspicions. John Adams believed the French government was sabotaging his 
mission and kept a watchful eye on French actions. But his main concern would be 
Britain and its interference with Dutch affairs. It was not until the outbreak of the French 
Revolution that made events in France of greater interest and intensified the political 
divisions in the United States.  Federalists, including John Quincy Adams and William 
Vans Murray, became increasingly suspicious of the French revolutionaries and believed 
they intended to revolutionize the world. John Quincy continuously warned that France 
intended to influence American policy like it was controlling Dutch politics. Murray went 
so far as to set up plans to inflict pains and horrors on France in order to protect the 
United States and preserve its independence. While the political divisions at home were 
worsening and it became increasingly clear that France intended to influence American 
politics, it became even more important to avoid political entanglement and keep the 
United States, one of the last beacons of hope in the world, from the corruptions of 
Europe and especially France. Throughout the period between 1780 and 1801 the three 
diplomats warned that a similar situation of factionalism and foreign intervention, 
especially at the hands of France, as in the Netherlands could also afflict the United 
States, which they sought to avoid at all costs.  
97 
 
Bibliography 
 
Primary sources 
 
Diary and Autobiography of John Adams, vol. 1: Diary 1755-1770; edited by L.H. 
Butterfield (Cambridge, MA 1961).  
 
Diary and Autobiography of John Adams, vol. 2: Diary 1771-1781; edited by L.H. 
Butterfield (Cambridge, MA 1961).  
 
Diary and Autobiography of John Adams, vol. 3: Diary 1782-1804 & Autobiography Part 
One to October 1776; edited by L.H. Butterfield (Cambridge, MA 1961).  
 
Diary and Autobiography of John Adams, vol. 4: Autobiography Part Two and Three 
1777-1780 & Index; edited by L.H. Butterfield (Cambridge, MA 1961).  
 
Elliot, J., (ed.), The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adaption of the 
Federal Constitution (5 vols.; Washington, D.C., 1854). 
 
Ford, W.C., (ed.), ‘Letters of William Vans Murray to John Quincy Adams, 1797-1803’, 
Annual report of the American Historical Association for the year 1912 (Washington, 
D.C. 1914), 341-708. 
 
Guinta, M.A., et al., The Emerging Nation: A Documentary History of the Foreign 
Relations of the United States under the Articles of Confederation, 1780-1789 (3 vols.; 
Washington, DC 1996). 
 
Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, vol. 15: September 2 to December 31, 
1779; edited by Library of Congress (Washington, D.C. 1909). 
 
98 
 
Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, vol. 17: May 8 to September 6, 1780; 
edited by Library of Congress (Washington, D.C. 1910). 
 
Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, vol. 3: September 21 to December 30, 
1775; edited by Library of Congress (Washington, D.C. 1905). 
 
Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, vol. 8: May 22 to October 2, 1777; 
edited by Library of Congress (Washington, D.C. 1907). 
 
Madison, J., ‘The Federalist No. 10’, in: G. Carey and J. McClellan (eds.), The Federalist 
(Dubuque, IA 1990), 43-47. 
 
Morse, J., A Sermon, Exhibiting the Present Dangers, and Consequent Duties of the 
Citizens of the United States of America. Delivered at Charlestown, April 25, 1799. The 
Day of the National Fast (Charlestown, MA 1799). 
 
Murray, W.V., Political Sketches, inscribed to his excellency John Adams, … By a citizen 
of the United States (1787).  
 
Osgood, D., A Discourse, Delivered February 19, 1795, The Day Set Apart by the 
President for a General Thanksgiving Through the United States (Boston 1795). 
 
Robinson, J., Proofs of a Conspiracy Against All the Religious and Governments of 
Europe, Carried on in the Secret Meetings of Free Masons, Illuminati, and Reading 
Societies (Edinburgh 1797). 
 
Sparks, J., (ed.), The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, vol. 9: 
William Carmichael, John Laurens, C.W.F. Dumas (Boston 1830). 
 
The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, vol. 16: February 1794 – July 1794; edited by H.C. 
Syrett (University of Virginia Press 2011). 
99 
 
 
The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 22: 23 March 1775 through 27 October 1776; 
edited by Willcox et al. (Yale University Press 1982). 
 
The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 23: 27 October 1776 through 30 April 1777; 
edited by Willcox et al. (Yale University Press 1983). 
 
The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 33: 1 July through 15 November 1780; edited by 
Oberg et al. (Yale University Press 1998). 
 
The Papers of James Madison, Congressional Series, vol. 16 (University of Virginia 
Press 1989). 
 
The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 10; 22 June to 31 December 1786; edited by B.B. 
Oberg (Princeton University Press 1954). 
 
The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 12: 7 August 1787 to 31 Marc 1788; edited by B.B. 
Oberg (Princeton University Press 1955). 
 
The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 23: 1 January to 31 May 1792; edited by C.T. 
Culllen (Princeton University Press 1990). 
 
The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 24: 1 June to 31 December 1792; edited by C.T. 
Culllen (Princeton University Press 1990). 
 
The Writings of James Madison, vol. 6: Correspondence, 1790-1802; edited by G. Hunt 
(New York 1906). 
 
Thomas Paine, The Life and Writings of Thomas Paine; edited by D.E. Wheeler (10 vols.; 
New York 1908). 
 
100 
 
Van der Capellen, J.D., Brieven van en aan Joan Derck van der Capellen van de Poll; 
edited by Willem Hendrik de Beaufort (Utrecht 1879). 
 
Vreede, G.W., (ed.), Mr. Laurens Pieters van de Spiegel en zijne Tijdgenooten (1737-
1800) (4 vols.; Middelburg 1874-77). 
 
Washington, G., ‘Farewell Address’, in: D. Ravitch (eds.), The American Reader (New 
York 2000), 71-77. 
 
George Washington, ‘Sixth Annual State of the Union Address, 19 Nov. 1794’, Annals of 
Congress (Washington, D.C. 1855), 4:787-91. 
 
Writings of John Quincy Adams, vol. 1: 1779-1796; edited by W.C. Ford (New York 
1968). 
 
Writings of John Quincy Adams, vol. 2: 1796-1801; edited by W.C. Ford (New York 
1968). 
 
 
Secondary literature 
 
Appleby, J., ‘Radicalizing the War for Independence: American Responses to the French 
Revolution’, American Studies 41: 1 (1996), 7-16. 
 
Bailyn, B., The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (New York 1967). 
 
Bemis, S.F., A Diplomatic History of the United States (New York 1950). 
 
Bemis, S.F., John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy (New 
York 1949). 
 
101 
 
Bemis, S.F., The Diplomacy of the American Revolution: the Foundations of American 
Diplomacy (New York 1935). 
 
Bilt, E.F. van de, Becoming John Adams: the making of a great American in Leiden, 
1780-1782 (Leiden 2005). 
 
Boorstin, D.J., America and the Image of Europe: reflections on American thought 
(Cleveland 1960). 
 
Bradley Thompson, C., John Adams and the Spirit of Liberty (University Press of Kansas 
1998). 
 
Brake, W.P. te, ‘Dutch Republic and the Creation of the United States’, in: H. 
Krabbedam, C. van Minnen and G. Scott-Smith, Four Centuries of Dutch-American 
Relations, 1609-2009 (Amsterdam 2009), 204-16. 
 
Brake, W.P. te, ‘Popular Politics in the Dutch Patriot Revolution’, Theory and Society 14 
(1985) 199-220. 
 
Brake, W.P. te, ‘The Dutch Republic and the Creation of the United States’, in: H. 
Krabbedam, C.A. van Minnen, and G. Scott-Smith (eds.), Four Centuries of Dutch-
American Relations (Middelburg 2009) 204-18. 
 
Brake, W.P. te, Revolutionary conflict in the Dutch Republic: The patriot crisis in 
Overijssel, 1780-1787 (Ann Arbor, Mich. 1977).  
 
Cerisier, A.M., Le Politique Hollandais (Amsterdam 1781-82). 
 
Colenbrander, H.T., De Bataafsche Republiek (Amsterdam 1908).  
 
102 
 
Congelton, R.D., ‘America’s neglected debt to the Dutch, an institutional perspective’, 
Constitutional Political Economy 19:1 (2008), 35-59. 
 
DeConde, A., ‘The Role of William Vans Murray in the Peace Negotiations between 
France and the United States, 1800’, Huntington Library Quarterly 15:2 (Feb. 1952), 
185-94. 
 
DeConde, A., ‘William Vans Murray’s Political Sketches: A Defense of the American 
Experiment’, The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 41:4 (Mar. 1955), 623-40.  
 
Dull, J.R., A Diplomatic History of the American Revolution (Yale University Press 
1985). 
 
Echeverria, D., Mirage in the West: A History of the French Image of American Society 
to 1815 (Princeton 1957). 
 
Edler, F., The Dutch Republic and the American Revolution (Baltimore 1911). 
 
Elkins, S. and McKitrick, E., The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic, 
1788-1800 (Oxford University Press 1993). 
 
Ferling, J., ‘John Adams, Diplomat’, The William and Mary Quarterly, 15:2 (Apr. 1994), 
227-52. 
 
Ferling, J., John Adams: a life (Knoxville 1992). 
 
Geyl, P., Geschiedenis van de Nederlandse stam, 3 vols. (3 vols.; Amsterdam en Antwerp 
1948-59). 
 
Gilbert, F., To the Farewell Address: ideas of early American foreign policy (Princeton 
University Press 1961). 
 
103 
 
Gou, L. de,  Het plan van constitutie van 1796 (The Hague 1975). 
 
Gou, L. de, Het ontwerp van constitutie van 1797 (3 vols.; The Hague 1983-1985). 
 
Gou, L. de,  De staatsregeling van 1798 (2 vols.; The Hague 1988-1990). 
 
Gou, L. de,  De staatsregeling van 1801 (The Hague 1995). 
 
Handler, E., America and Europe in the Political Thought of John Adams (Cambridge 
1964). 
 
Harris, J., An Introduction to the History of the Dutch Republic for the last ten years, 
reckoning from the year 1777 (London 1788). 
 
Hazen, C.D., Contemporary American Opinion of the French Revolution (Baltimore 
1897). 
 
Hill, P.P., William Vans Murray, Federalist Diplomat (Syracuse, NY 1971). 
 
Hollander, A.N.J. den, Visie en Verantwoording. Socoliogische essays over het eigene en 
het andere (Assen 1968). 
 
Hutson, J.H., ‘John Adams and the Birth of Dutch-American Friendship, 1780-82’, in: 
J.W. Schulte Nordholt and R.P. Swieringa (eds.), A Bilateral Bicentennial: A History of 
the Dutch-American Relations, 1782-1982 (Amsterdam 1982), 19-32. 
 
Hutson, J.H., ‘The Origins of ‘The Paranoid Style in American Politics’: Public Jealousy 
from the Age of Walpole to the Age of Jackson’, in: Hall, Murrin, and Tate (eds.), Saints 
and Revolutionaries: Essays on Early American History (New York and London, 1984), 
332-72. 
 
104 
 
Hutson, J.H., John Adams and the Diplomacy of the American Revolution (University 
Press of Kansas 1980). 
 
Israel, J., The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477-1806 (London 1995). 
 
Kaplan, L.S., ‘The Founding Fathers and the Two Confederations: The United States of 
America and the United Provinces of the Netherlands, 1783-89’, in: J.W. Schulte 
Nordholt en R.P. Swierenga (eds.), A Bilaterial Bicentennial : a history of Dutch-
American relations, 1782-1982 (New York and Amsterdam 1982) 33-48. 
 
Klein, S.R.E., Patriots Republikanisme: Poltieke cultuur in Nederland (1766-1787) 
(Amsterdam 1995). 
 
Kluit, A., Iets over den laatsten Engelschen oorlog met de Republiek (Amsterdam 1794). 
 
Kossmann, E.H., De lage landen 1780-1980. Twee eeuwen Nederland en Belgie (2 vols.; 
Amsterdam 1978)  
 
Maier, P., From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of 
American Opposition to Britain, 1765-1776 (New York 1972). 
 
Mandrillon, J., Gedenkschriften betrekkelijk tot de Omwenteling in the Vereenidge 
Nederlanden in 1787 (Dunkirk 1792). 
 
McCullough, D., John Adams (New York 2001). 
 
Minnen, C.A. van, ‘Dutch-American Diplomatic Relations’, in: H. Krabbedam, C.A. van 
Minnen, and G. Scott-Smith (eds.), Four Centuries of Dutch-American Relations 
(Middelburg 2009) 260-70. 
 
Minnen, C.A. van, Yankees onder de zeespiegel: de Amerikaanse diplomaten n de Lage 
Landen en hun berichtgeving, 1815-1850 (Amsterdam 1991). 
105 
 
 
Nagel, P.C., John Quincy Adams: a public life, a private life (Cambridge, MA and 
London 1997). 
 
Nicolaisen, P., ‘John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and the Dutch Patriots’, in: Sadosky et al. 
(eds.), Old World, New World: America and Europe in the Age of Jefferson (University 
of Virginia Press 2010), 105-130. 
 
Palmer, R.R., ‘Two Americans in Two Dutch Republics: The Adamses, Father and Son’, 
in: J.W. Schulte Nordholt en R.P. Swierenga (eds.), A Bilaterial Bicentennial : a history 
of Dutch-American relations, 1782-1982 (New York and Amsterdam 1982), 3-18. 
 
Perl-Rosenthal, N., ‘Private Letters and Public Diplomacy: The Adams Network and the 
Quasi-War, 1797–1798’, Journal of the Early Republic 31:2 (Summer 2011), 283-311. 
 
Ramsay, D., A Dissertation of the Manner of Acquiring the Character and Privileges of a 
Citizen of the United States (1789). 
 
Riker, W.H., ‘Dutch and American Federalism’, Journal of the History of Ideas 18 
(1957), 495-521.  
 
Riley, J.C., ‘Financial and Economic Ties: The First Century’, in: J.W. Schulte Nordholt 
en R.P. Swierenga (eds.), A Bilaterial Bicentennial : a history of Dutch-American 
relations, 1782-1982 (New York and Amsterdam 1982), 49-65.  
 
Riley, J.C., ‘Foreign Credit and Fiscal Stability: Dutch Investment in the United States, 
1781-1794’, The Journal of American History 65:3 (Dec. 1978), 654-78. 
 
Rooy, P. de, Republiek van Rivaliteiten (Amsterdam 2002).  
 
Ryan, M.P., ‘Party Formation in the United States Congress, 1789 to 1796: A 
Quantitative Analysis’, William and Mary Quarterly, 28:4 (Oct. 1971), 523-42. 
106 
 
 
Sas, N.C.F. van, De metamorphose van Nederland: Van oude orde naar moderniteit, 
1750-1900 (Amsterdam 2004). 
 
Schama, S., Patriotten en Bevrijders, 1780-1813 (Amsterdam 2005). 
 
Schulte Nordholt, J.W., ‘The Example of the Dutch Republic for American Federalism’, 
in: J.C. Boogman en G.N. van der Plaat, Federalism: History and Current Significance of 
a Form of Government (Den Haag 1980), 437-49. 
 
Schulte Nordholt, J.W., ‘The Impact of the American Revolution on the Dutch Republic’, 
in: Library of Congress, The Impact of the American Revolution Abroad (Washington 
1976). 
 
Schulte Nordholt, J.W., ‘Tot ik John Adams leerde kennen’: een schets in woord en beeld 
van John Adams’ diplomatie in de Nederlanden, 1781-82, & van zijn huis in Quincy, 
Massachusetts (The Hague and Amsterdam 1982). 
 
Schulte Nordholt, J.W., Voorbeeld in de Verte: De invloed van de Amerikaanse revolutie 
in Nederland (Baarn 1979). 
 
Shackelford, G.G., Jefferson’s adoptive son: the life of William Short, 1759-1849 
(University Press of Kentucky 1993). 
 
Smith, R.M., ‘Constructing American National Identity: Strategies of the Federalists’, in: 
D. Ben-Atar and B.B. Oberg (eds.), Federalists Reconsidered (1998), 19-40. 
 
Stanhope, P.D., Fourth Earl of Chesterfield, ‘Some Account of the Government of the 
Republic of the Seven United Provinces’, in The Letters of Philip Dormer Stanhope, 
Fourth Earl of Chesterfield; edited by B. Dobrée (6 vols.; New York 1932) 3:605-12. 
 
107 
 
Stourzh, G., Benjamin Franklin and American Foreign Policy (Chicago 1954). 
 
Strout, C., The American Image of the Old World (New York and London 1963). 
 
Sulivane, C., ‘A Sketch of William Vans Murray’, Southern History Association 5 
(March 1901), 151-58. 
 
Velema, W.R.E., ‘Revolutie, Republiek en Constitutie. De ideologische context van de 
eerste Nederlandse grondwet’, in: N.C.F. van Sas and H. te Velde (eds.), De eeuw van de 
Grondwet: Grondwet en politiek in Nederland, 1798-1917 (Deventer 1998), 20-46. 
 
Vitringa, C.L., Gedenkschrift (4 vols.; Arnhem 1857-64). 
 
Welling, G.M., The prize of neutrality: trade relations between Amsterdam and North 
America 1771-1817, A Computational Study (Groningen 1998). 
 
Westermann, J.C., The Netherlands and the United States (The Hague 1935). 
 
Wijk, F.W. van,  De Republiek en Amerika, 1776 tot 1782 (Leiden 1921). 
 
Winter, P.J. van, Het aandeel van den Amsterdamschen handel aan den opbouw van het 
Amerikaansche Gemeenebest  (2 vols.; Den Haag 1927-1933). 
 
Wood, G.S., Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815 (New York 
2009). 
 
Zwitzer, H.L., Aan het Volk van Nederland: Het patriottisch program uit 1781 
(Amsterdam 1987). 
 
 
